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This dissertation builds on and contributes to work in the field of 
financial risk management, specifically option-implied probability 
distributions. Although a number of studies have examined estimating 
the middle portion of probability distributions, there has not been a 
strong focus on the tails of the distribution, which are of particular 
importance in a risk management setting. As such, this study provides 
additional insights about these tails, by horse-racing four different tail-
fitting methods. This research differs from previous studies by 
introducing a new, non-parametric, heuristic tail-fitting method that is 
similar in methodology to the consensus, most-often used method to 
estimate the middle portion of the probability distribution; and, by 
identifying which tail fitting method produces the most stable estimate 
with the least tail-option pricing error. In short, the non-parameterized, 
heuristic method, similar to the fast and stable method most commonly 
used to estimate the middle portion of the probability distribution, is also 
stable, with the least option pricing bias in the tails of the distribution. 
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Option pricing theory, along with increasingly available data and 
computational power, presents an opportunity to reveal valuable 
information about market expectations and risk preferences.  Investors 
have long used derivatives to infer information, e.g., cost of carry rates 
and Black-Scholes implied volatilities.  Beyond just this, with a complete 
set of options prices, an asset’s entire risk-neutral probability 
distribution (RND) can be revealed.  Given the well-documented non-
normality of most assets’ returns (i.e. the Black-Scholes volatility smile), 
the higher moments of the return distribution are of interest. 
 
Foremost, knowledge of the RND is desirable because it enables the 
pricing of any derivative of the underlying asset with the same time to 
expiration, regardless if it be illiquid or ‘non-vanilla.’  Beyond this 
obvious application, there are several lines of research that use option-
implied RNDs.   
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For example, central bankers use RNDs to assess market sentiment over 
future changes in interest rates, exchange rates and stock prices, and 
likewise to confirm the market’s acceptance of major policy decisions.  Of 
particular interest is the predictive power of RNDs prior to major 
economic events such as crash episodes, exchange rate/interest rate 
regime changes, wars, and elections.  RNDs are fruitful for this type of 
analysis because unlike other market-based time series data, which in 
isolation capture only an expectation (and therefore represent only one 
expected economic scenario), RNDs capture the uncertainty that is 
fundamentally inherent in the marketplace -- that there are multiple 
future scenarios. 
 
Another line of research uses RNDs to measure risk aversion.  They 
separately estimate the risk neutral density from option prices and the 
objective density from historical returns of the underlying asset, and use 
these two separately derived functions to infer implied relative risk 
aversion.  Knowledge of economy-wide risk aversion is of particular 
importance since it makes possible a number of forecasting applications 
in risk management, which require the RND to first be converted into its 





In this thesis, I develop a particularly stable method for fitting the tails of 
the RND.  The tails have proven difficult to estimate, due mainly to data 
limitations.  Options are only written on a limited range of strike prices 
and those that are written far away-from-the-money tend to have little 
liquidity.  However the tails are of prime importance when attempting to 
predict major market events, the most common application of RNDs.  My 
model will be tested (horse-raced) against other methods that have been 
put forth:  first, in a time series analysis of stability; then in a pricing 






REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
On April 26th, 1973 the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) was 
spun-off from the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), originally to celebrate 
the Board of Trade’s 125th anniversary.  The idea for the Exchange is said 
to have come from the brothers “Eddie” and “Billy” O’Connor, prominent 
CBOT soybean traders, and Joseph Sullivan, then-assistant to the CBOT 
president, who would become the first president of the CBOE.  The 
Exchange came about despite antagonism from many of the existing 
members of the CBOT, who felt options to be too specialized for exchange 
trading.  Nevertheless, for the first two years of the CBOE’s existence, the 
“smoking room” of the CBOT became the first trading floor for 
standardized options. 
 
While this was the beginning of modern-day trading in standardized 
options, over-the-counter (OTC) options have existed since antiquity.  In 
fact, some of the earliest-dated writings on record, cuneiform tablets 
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from circa 1750 BCE, are option contracts on real estate.  Indeed, the 
Code of Hammurabi, pre-dating Moses’ Law by roughly 200 years, gives 
legal foundation for option-contract rights on real property.   
 
But 1973 wasn’t really when organized options markets became a thing 
either.  At that time, the CBOE only listed call options, no puts until 
1977.  As well, it wasn’t until 1983 that they first listed index options, 
the most popular traded contracts today.  To tell the truth, the date 
when the CBOE really came to become was Black Monday, October 19th, 
the 1987 crash!   That being when the overall stock market lost over 20% 
during morning hours trading; all CBOE contracts nearly went to zero in 
the following 24 hours, only to survive by a single, miraculous trade in 
the CBOT’s index futures market 1 ; a date that the standard Black-
Scholes Option Pricing Model completely broke down, and hasn’t 





1973 was also the year when Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton 
(1973) standardized option pricing.  Prior to, the valuing of options was 
                                                          
1
 See Vitale (2012). 
2
 This could also be viewed as a qualitatively different kind of risk (i.e. an “on/off” risk, 
liquidity-risk), separate from the asset’s return distribution. 
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somewhat ‘chaotic’ in-itself.  Not just because the pricing of contingent 
claims was beyond the ‘mathematic dossier’ of most practitioners, but 
because the models depended on a correct valuation of the risk of the 
underlying asset; which is another, simpler, but also quasi-understood 
problem; too many degrees-of-freedom from a quant’s perspective; and 
too complex overall from a practitioner’s perspective.  Sprenkle (1964) 
was the standard prior to Black-Scholes: 
 
𝐶 = 𝑆𝑁(𝑑1) − (1 − 𝑍)𝐾𝑁(𝑑2)𝑒













,       𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎√𝑡 
 
𝐶   = value of the call option 
𝑆   = underlying share price 
𝑁(. ) = cumulative standard normal distribution function 
𝑍  = degree of risk-aversion 
𝐾  = strike price 
𝑟  = growth rate of the underlying share price 
𝑡   = time to expiration 




Of the model’s inputs S, K, and t are known, while r, Z, and σ must be 
assumed.  The Black-Scholes model simplifies this by setting the growth 
rate of the underlying share price, r, equal to the risk-free interest rate, 
and risk-aversion, Z, equal to zero; leaving only one non-observable 
input, σ, the volatility of the underlying returns.  The rationale for this 
simplification comes from a no-arbitrage argument.  If the model holds 
true, then the call option’s delta, the ratio of the change in the option’s 





= 𝑁(𝑑1).       (2) 
 
This delta can be replicated by taking a leveraged position in the 
underlying stock.  Therefore, a risk-free portfolio can be created by 
combining a long position in the call with a dynamically hedged short 
position in the leveraged underlying stock; dynamic, because the delta 
changes as the underlying share price changes (this is referred to as the 
option’s gamma).  Essentially, in this model, risk is priced as if the 
derivative’s required return falls along the capital market line of the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM): 
 






 𝑟𝐶 = required return of the option 
 𝑟𝑓 = risk-free rate 
 ∆𝐶 = delta of the option 
 𝛽𝑆 = beta of the underlying asset 
 𝑟𝑚𝑘𝑡 = required return of the market portfolio. 
 
While equation (1) is un-wieldy at first glance, its intuition is relatively 
simple.  This was shown by Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein’s (1979) binomial 
option pricing model, which, while a simplification of Black-Scholes, is 
actually more flexible (less parameterized), and is used by many option 
practitioner-traders today.    
 
The binomial option pricing formula fits the following model: 
 
[Insert Figure (1) Here] 
 
The rationale for risk-neutral pricing can be found if one considers the 
model in Figure (1).  There are three securities: a risk-free bond, a stock, 
and a call option on said stock.  But, there are only two possible states at 
time t, an upward move or a downward move.  The prices and payouts of 
the three securities must be linked to each other, or else there are 
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arbitrage opportunities to lock-in risk-free returns greater than the risk-
free rate (an assumed absurdity!).  Who knew the game of musical chairs 
was preparing children to understand option pricing? 
 
In essence, the call option only exists for convenience; its price and 
payouts can be replicated by combining the prices and payouts of the 
risk-free bond and the underlying stock.  Therefore, no new risk (or 
additional degree-of-freedom) is added by introducing a call option to the 
market.  Suddenly, there is hope; options aren’t so mysterious.  They are 
but an organized means of bringing risk-management to everyone! If 
people want to buy options, market makers can provide the market, 
without having to take the opposite risk of their clients.  
 
The difference between the binomial option pricing model and Black-
Scholes is analogous to the difference between the binomial probability 
distribution and the normal distribution.  The binomial model can be 
applied in multiple, time-period steps.  Figure (2) shows this with two 
time periods3.  At the limit, with an infinite number of time periods 
between today and the option’s expiration date, the Black-Scholes model 
is derived, where the underlying asset is assumed to follow a continuous-
time Brownian motion. 
 
                                                          
3




Problems with the Standard Model. 
 
The 2008 real-estate, mortgage crash is more recent in our memories 
than the 1987 stock market crash, but the two events have many 
similarities.  New technology, whether part of the real-asset portfolio, or 
the ‘intangible’ portfolio,  demands an amount of capital be employed 
towards its undertaking.  How much of our overall capital should be 
employed to these new endeavors is something of a guess.  The ‘norm,’ in 
American business history has been to provide too much capital to new 
markets, wait until the ‘bubble’ bursts, and then feed capital at a more 
restrained rate to the surviving firms.  Figure (3) paints this picture. 
 
Portfolio insurance became popular in 1986 and 1987, leading to a 542% 
and 128% rise in average, daily option volume traded in those two years 
respectively.  In the 2008 real-estate crash it was collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDSs) that overwhelmed the 
markets, but in the mid-to-late 80’s it was options.  Portfolio insurance is 
essentially a put option on a basket of underlying stocks.  The market 
makers of portfolio insurance offset their position by taking short index 
futures at the CBOT.  The CBOT market makers offset their position by 




The Friday prior to Black Monday, Oct. 16th, 1987 was an option and 
futures expiration date.  That week had been one of the worst weeks in 
stock market history, with the market losing over 10%.  Due to record 
volumes of trade, many market makers were unable to fully hedge their 
positions prior to the close of trade that Friday, leaving a back-log of 
short orders to be filled Monday morning.  Monday morning opened on 
time, but in a free-fall, the stock market losing 20% in hours.  Tuesday 
morning most of the specialists on the NYSE couldn’t open at all, having 
run out of trading capital, with banks un-willing to lend in such a 
chaotic market. 
 
Blair Hull was Chairman and chief executive officer of Hull Trading 
Company, a prominent market maker at the CBOE.  At 12:15 pm ET, on 
Tuesday, the CBOE and NYSE have halted trading, with the NYSE in 
agreement to open in an hour at a level that would put the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIA) 500 points lower (roughly another 20% drop).  
Hull happened to also be a member of the nearby CBOT, the only one of 
his 285-employee operation, a membership he had never before utilized.  
He walked over to the index futures pit to find only one contract with 
sellers, there were no buyers in any contract.  It was the thinly traded 




He started buying, un-hedeged long positions, and quickly started a 
short-squeeze, panic buying by all traders of the MMI, who were 
suddenly all short in a rapidly rising market.  The other index futures 
quickly followed suit, and by 12:38 pm members of the NYSE forced their 
exchange to re-open, as they were being short-squeezed in the underlying 
stocks.  The DJIA sky-rocketed, closing the day with a record gain of 102 
points!  Many describe it as the greatest, group euphoria across all 
exchanges imaginable; having gone to the brink and survived.  The next 
day the DJIA would rise a new record 126 points!  Within a month, the 
stock market was setting new all-time highs, and would continue on for 
twelve more years of a nineteen-year bull market run. 
 
Hull was relying on an old, trader adage: “be long the halt.”  It’s a 
courageous strategy that relies on cooler heads, and lenders of last resort, 
to prevail during halted trading.  But that doesn’t always happen; that 
Tuesday morning most stocks on the NYSE didn’t open until after 11:00 
am, only to be halted again an hour later.  Prior to normal morning 
trading hours, the Federal Reserve had issued a statement affirming its 
readiness to serve as a source of liquidity to support the economic and 
financial system.  But the statement is all they would provide throughout 
the crisis.  In fairness, politically the Federal Reserve wouldn’t want to 
start a short-squeeze like Hull did, nor do we know what would have 




Hull’s company used a proprietary model separate from Black-Scholes to 
price options.  Regardless, Black-Scholes, or the binomial model was the 
standard option pricing model in 1987.  The Black-Scholes model 
assumes stock prices follow a log-normal distribution; and therefore their 
returns a normal distribution.  This means zero skewness and kurtosis of 
three.  Figure (4) shows the z-score of daily returns of the S&P 100 in the 
week before and of the Black Monday crash.  Returns are scaled by the 
implied-volatility index of the S&P 100 (VXO), which is an average, option-
implied volatility across all S&P 100 options.   
 
As can be seen, in four of the ten days, the absolute value of the z-score 
is greater than two; that’s 40% of the returns landing farther than two-
standard deviations away from center.  In a standard, normal 
distribution this should only happen once every 22 days; the odds of it 
happening four times in ten days: 0.0001%.  Moreover, there are two, 
three-standard deviation events in-a-row.  The odds of one, three-
standard deviation event: 0.135%; the odds of two-in-a-row: basically 
zero, by any practical limits.  The skewness of returns over this ten-day 
period was -1.56, and kurtosis 6.98!   
 
It’s not that portfolio insurance and standardized-options were a bad 
idea, precisely the opposite, but that market-makers hope in the Black-
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Scholes model to hedge their trading-risk was unfounded.  The idea of 
no-arbitrage pricing makes head-sense, but who in their heart really 
believes the ‘invisible-hand’ of the marketplace will stick to a normal 
distribution?  Nor were CDOs and CDSs necessarily a bad idea during the 
2000’s real-estate boom.  But liquidity is a blessing not to be taken for 
granted.  It can’t be stored up, predicted, or replicated.  It exists for the 
moment; tailor-made; in-valuable.    
 
The Volatility Smile 
 
Ever since Black-Scholes it has been common to quote option prices in 
terms of their implied-volatilities.  Since the underlying asset’s standard 
deviation, σ, is the only non-observable input to the model, if one knows 
the option price, they can ‘back-out’ the σ that would cause the model to 
price the option correctly.  This is theoretically similar to a Method-of-
Moments estimate assuming a normal distribution of underlying returns.  
There is no closed-form solution for this inverse problem, however, 
Manaster and Koehler (1982) developed a Newton-Raphson numerical, 
iterative-search method that guarantees convergence to an implied-
volatility.   
 
The CBOE calculates and distributes many implied-volatility indices, but 
the VIX index is the unrivaled bellwether of U.S. large-cap stock market 
15 
 
volatility.  It estimates the average, annualized 30-day implied-volatility 
across all strike prices of the S&P 500 index.  Its methodology, outlined 
in CBOE (2015), is to create a theoretical portfolio of calls and puts that 
should return the underlying price minus its futures price, squared.  
Basically, the ‘portfolio’ engineers a parabolic return distribution, and 
gives us the square-root of the price of that payout-scheme.  As long as 
we believe in no-arbitrage pricing, it all makes a lot of sense. Figure (5) 
shows the history of this bellwether. 
 
A casual glance at Figure (5) reveals that the market-wide implied-
volatility is time-varying, mean-reverting, and prone to large, upward 
spikes in down markets.  The upward spikes are evidence of negatively 
skewed and leptokurtic returns.  However, the business-cycle adjusted, 
average volatility has remained relatively constant, around 25%.  Another 
way to view this is that the long-run, average volatility did not adjust 
higher after the extraordinarily large spike upwards on Black Monday.  
However, this does not tell the whole story.  The VIX index is largely 
driven by implied-volatilities at strike prices around the mean of the S&P 
500 index’s expected return distribution, not by returns in the tails of the 
distribution.   
 
Another way to view implied-volatilities is through the volatility smile, a 
graph of implied-volatilities across strike prices for a single date and 
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expiration date.  It’s called a ‘smile’ because implied-volatilities tend to be 
higher away-from-the-money, in other words, away from the underlying 
asset’s price.  Figure (6) illustrates this for several asset classes. 
 
If the Brownian motion assumption of the Black-Scholes model holds 
true, then implied-volatilities should be the same for all strike prices, in 
other words, there should be no ‘smile,’ but a flat line with a level equal 
to the single volatility of the Brownian motion.  If a ‘smile’ exists, it 
indicates that the underlying asset’s expected return distribution has 
higher probabilities of returns in the tails of the distribution than would 
exist in a normal distribution, in other words, that the returns are 
leptokurtic, a kurtosis higher than three.  If the smile is higher on one 
side than the other, oftentimes called a ‘smirk,’ then there exists 
skewness in returns to the higher side, which again, should not exist if 
returns are normally distributed. 
 
Rubenstein (1985), published before Black Monday, found no volatility 
smile in index or individual equity options, finding any variance in 
implied-volatilities to be within option bid-ask spreads, which admittedly, 
were relatively large at the time.  Bates (1991) and (2000) revisited the 
problem and explicitly found that Black Monday was the advent of the 
volatility smile.  It didn’t exist before, but has existed in S&P 100 and 500 




And the phenomenon is by no means unique to equity index options.  
Mayhew (1995) and Toft and Prucyk (1997) found volatility smiles for 
individual stocks, although surprisingly not as pronounced as those in 
index options.  Campa, Chang, and Reider (1998) and Bollen and Rasiel 
(2002) found that foreign exchange options exhibit volatility smiles, 
although again, not near as pronounced as those in index or even 
individual equity options; however, currency implied volatilities are much 
lower than equities’ in general.  Jarrow, Li, and Zhao (2003) likewise 
found volatility smiles in the interest rate options market.  Figure (6) also 
shows ‘smiles’ for gold, oil futures, and a ‘smirk’ for options on volatility 
itself.  The positive skewness implied in the VIX index correlates with the 




The fact that index options exhibit a larger ‘smile’ than individual stocks 
illustrates an important aspect of option pricing.  A large tail event in the 
index is more likely due to a liquidity-risk event, whereas tail events in 
individual stocks could very well be unique to only that stock.  Since the 
market-wide liquidity event is more ‘important’ to investors, its option-
implied probability is higher than an otherwise equally-likely event with 
less ‘importance.’  While the reason for this is not immediately obvious, it 
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has to do with risk-neutral pricing, briefly discussed before in relation to 
Figure (1).  
 
Note in Figure (1) that the underlying stock returns either 𝑒𝑟𝑡+𝜎√𝑡  or 
𝑒𝑟𝑡−𝜎√𝑡.  ‘r’ in this case represents the expected return of the stock.  In 
turns out, in solving for the option’s price, the choice of r is unimportant; 
it drops out of the final solution.  Most textbooks set r equal to zero in 
the binomial model for simplicity, hence the nomenclature U and 1/U for 
𝑒𝜎√𝑡 and 𝑒−𝜎√𝑡.  However, if one really wants to maintain the binomial 
model’s comparability with Black-Scholes, r should be set to the risk-free 
rate. 
 
If one sets r equal to the risk-free rate, then both the bond and the stock 
have the same required return.  Since these two securities ‘complete’ the 
market (since they are two unique securities in a two-state market), if 
their returns are the same, then every security in this market will have 
that same required return, in this case, the risk-free rate!  The call option 
described by the middle tree in Figure (1) is another security in this 
market; therefore it too should return the risk-free rate.  Equation (4) 
states this using the probabilities implied by the binomial model: 
 
𝐶𝑡 = 𝑝𝑈 (𝑆𝑒
𝑟𝑓𝑡+𝜎√𝑡 − 𝐾) + (1 − 𝑝𝑈)∅ = 𝐶𝑜𝑒




The value of the call at its expiration date, 𝐶𝑡, is equal to the probability 
of an upward move times its value in an upward move, plus the 
probability of a downward move times its value in a downward move, 
which equals the initial call price grossed up at the risk-free rate.  In fact 
any security’s value follows this same model: 
 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝑝𝑈𝑋𝑡,𝑈 + 𝑝𝐷𝑋𝑡,𝐷 = 𝑋𝑜𝑒
𝑟𝑓𝑡,     (5) 
 
where 𝑋𝑡  is the value of said security at time t, 𝑋𝑡,𝑈  is its value in an 
upward move, and 𝑋𝑡,𝐷 in a downward move.  If there are more than two 
possible future states of the market, the future value of the security is a 
weighted average of the security in each state, weighted by the 
probability of each state: 
 
 𝑋𝑡 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑋𝑡,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑜𝑒
𝑟𝑓𝑡.      (6) 
 
Note that while the Black-Scholes model assumes an infinite number of 
possible future states of the market (compared to only two for the 
binomial model), its Brownian motion assumption means the 
probabilities of those future states follow a normal distribution, a 
distribution with only two moments: a mean and a variance.  Because 
there are only two degrees-of-freedom in defining a normal distribution, 
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the same two securities, a risk-free bond and an underlying stock 
returning the risk-free rate, are enough to ‘complete’ the market.  That 
said, the future value of a security whose returns follow a continuous 
probability distribution function (pdf) can be described in the continuous 
state equivalent of equation (6): 
 
𝑋𝑡 = ∫𝑋𝑡(𝑖)𝜃(𝑖)𝑑𝑖 = 𝑋𝑜𝑒
𝑟𝑓𝑡,     (7) 
 
where 𝜃(𝑖) is the pdf of 𝑋𝑡.   
 
One obvious concern should arise when considering risk-neutral pricing: 
in the real-world, neither the underlying stock nor the option should 
return the risk-free rate!  Equations (4) through (7) do not represent 
pricing in the real-world; they represent pricing in what is often referred 
to as the risk-neutral world.  It is an invented world created by assuming 
the stock returns the risk-free rate.  This is purely for pricing 
convenience; in this invented world one never needs to know investor 
risk-aversion or risk-premia for risky assets.   
 
However, this convenience comes at a cost.  The probabilities implied by 
the binomial model, 𝑝𝑈 and (1 − 𝑝𝑈), are not real-world probabilities; they 
are referred to as risk-neutral probabilities.  They are derived in such a 
way that forces the stock to return the risk-free rate.  The real-world 
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probabilities would have the stock return the risk-free rate plus a risk 
premium, based on the co-variance of the stock with the market and the 
market-wide appetite for risk.  For example Sprenkle’s formula, Equation 
(1), prices the option in the real-world.  All of the probabilities in 
Equations (4) through (7), including also those in the Black-Scholes 
formula, are risk-neutral probabilities.   
 





−𝑟𝑓𝑡,     (8) 
 
where 𝐸𝑃[. ]  is the expected value using real-world probabilities, often 
referred to as the P measure, and 𝐸𝑄[. ] is the expected value using risk-
neutral probabilities, referred to as the Q measure.  ‘r’ is the risk-
adjusted required return specific to asset X in the real-world, while ‘𝑟𝑓’ is 
the risk-free rate and the required return for all assets in the risk-neutral 
world. 
 
Cochrane (2005) derives the relationship between real-world probabilities 









where, 𝑝𝑄(𝑖) is the risk-neutral probability of state i, 𝑝𝑃(𝑖)  is the real-
world probability of state i, 𝑈′(𝑖) is the market representative’s marginal 
utility curve in state i, and 𝐸𝑃[𝑈′(. )]  is the market representative’s 
expected marginal utility, averaged across all states.   
 
It turns out that risk preferences do show up in the Black-Scholes and 
binomial models (and any other risk-neutral pricing models) -- they just 
show up in the probabilities rather than the required return.  Breaking 
down Equation (9), there are two components to risk-neutral 
probabilities: one due to rational expectations: the real-world 
probabilities; the second due to subjective preferences in the form of the 
marginal utility curve (scaled by average marginal utility), which 
represents the market-representative’s subjective value of an additional 
dollar added to her returns (or wealth).  It is as if both the head and heart 
play a role in determining probabilities. 
 
The higher the marginal utility (the subjective value of returns), the 
higher the risk-neutral probability; in other words, states of the world 
deemed more ‘important’ to the representative investor get a higher risk-
neutral probability than their corresponding real-world probability.  
Examples of people making decisions based on risk-neutral probabilities 
are common.  Consider that people consistently over-estimate the 
23 
 
probability of a plane crash4.  Consider that American’s spend more 
money on the lottery 5  (an objectively negative net-present-value 
investment) than all other forms of entertainment combined.  In an 
extreme example, consider that no one would take 5-to-6 odds on a game 
of Russian roulette!    
 
Bernoulli (1738) used decreasing marginal utility to solve the St. 
Petersburg paradox.  Consider a coin-flipping bet which pays-out based 
on the number of heads flipped in a row, doubling with each additional 
heads thrown (for example: it might payout $0 if a tails is flipped on the 
first toss; $100 if only one heads is thrown, followed by a tails; $200 if 
two heads are thrown; $400 for three, $800 for four, and doubling so on).  
One finds, using real-world probabilities of a fair coin, the expected 
payout of this bet is infinite!  But who would pay more than a few 
hundred dollars for it?   
 
The solution to the paradox is that people’s marginal utility of returns 
decreases the richer they get.  A marginal dollar is more ‘important’ to a 
poor person than to a rich person.  Thinking in terms of the binomial 
model, if there is an upward move, the representative investor is better 
off, and therefore values the marginal dollar less than she would have in 
a downward state.  Summing up, risk-neutral probabilities of a 
                                                          
4
 See Clark and Rock (2016). 
5
 $73B in 2017 according to Gallup, with an expected loss of $0.40 on the dollar.   
24 
 
downward move are relatively higher than probabilities of an upward 
move, compared to their real-world counterparts.  This causes the asset-
specific, risk-adjusted expected returns of all risky assets to decrease 




Before delving into the mechanics of estimating option-implied pdfs, it 
behooves us to look into some applications of such pdfs.  Foremost, 
knowledge of the pdf is desirable because it enables the pricing of any 
derivative of the underlying asset with the same time to expiration, 
regardless if it be illiquid or ‘non-vanilla.’  Beyond this obvious 
application, Table (3) summarizes three fronts of applications of option-
implied pdfs.    
 
For example, central bankers use option-implied pdfs to assess market 
sentiment over future changes in interest rates, exchange rates and 
stock prices, and likewise to confirm the market’s acceptance of major 
policy decisions.  Of particular interest is the predictive power of options 
prior to major economic events such as crash episodes, exchange 
rate/interest rate regime changes, wars, and elections.  Option-implied 
pdfs are fruitful for this type of analysis because unlike other market-
based time series data, which in isolation capture only an expectation 
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(and therefore represent only one expected economic scenario), pdfs 
capture the uncertainty that is fundamentally inherent in the 
marketplace -- that there are multiple future scenarios. 
 
A third line of research uses option-implied pdfs to measure risk 
aversion.  The risk-neutral density is estimated from option prices, while 
the objective density from historical returns; together these two infer 
implied-relative risk aversion.  Knowledge of economy-wide risk aversion 





The volatility smile may invalidate the Black-Scholes model, but not risk-
neutral pricing in general.  Real-world probabilities and risk-adjusted 
required rates of return cannot be solved for without having knowledge of 
market-wide utility preferences.  The subjective nature of these 
preferences makes them difficult to estimate (or to even grasp their full 
nature), which is therefore the reason investors found such hope in Black-
Scholes and the advent of risk-neutral pricing. 
 
However, the volatility smile is full of information about the underlying 
asset’s risk-neutral pdf.  Any asset with ‘enough’ option-prices (to 
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‘dynamically-complete’ the market; i.e. enough options at different strike 
prices), should have an estimable underlying risk-neutral pdf; and 
therefore, the price of any ‘non-unique’ security (i.e. a derivative) should 
also be estimable.  This endeavor has led to research in the inverse 
problem to option-pricing: using known, market-set option-prices to 
estimate the underlying asset’s pdf.  
 
The Inverse Problem 
 
Arrow (1964) showed that risk-neutral probabilities are unique and can 
be solved for in any ‘complete’ market model; i.e. a model with the same 
number of unique securities as states of the future world (such as a 
stock and a risk-free bond in a world with two states, as is the case with 
the binomial model).  Merton (1971) showed that risk-neutral 
probabilities are unique and can be solved for in any ‘dynamically-
compete’ market model (such as a stock and a risk-free bond in a world 
with two degrees-of-freedom, as is the case with Black-Scholes and its 
normally-distributed returns).   
 
Figure (7) gives an example of this inverse problem of using option prices 




The problem with Black-Scholes is its assumption of normally-
distributed returns, which is too simple to account for liquidity-risk, 
time-varying volatility, volatility spikes, and so forth.  The lack of an 
historical option-price database, and relatively poor computing power, 
meant the inverse option-pricing problem, of using option-prices to 
estimate the asset’s implied risk-neutral pdf, unfeasible until the mid-
1990s.   
 
There are two polar approaches to estimating the pdf from option prices.  
One is based on relatively strict assumptions, a model, which the 
observed option-prices must to adhere.  The opposite pole assumes no 
model, but a ‘sort of’ open-canvas for the option-prices to reveal their 
nature.  There are trade-offs between accuracy, bias, stability, and so-
forth, and as is usually the case, the best solution lies somewhere in-




How many option-prices are needed to ‘dynamically-complete’ the 
market?  According to Fama and French (1993) there are only three-
factors driving market returns (meaning a stock, the risk-free bond, and 
one option are enough to ‘dynamically-complete’ the three degrees-of-
freedom).  At most, a handful, five-factors, are cited in a single model by 
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researchers (meaning three options are needed).  In other words, there 
aren’t that many degrees-of-freedom.  The Black-Scholes two aren’t 
enough, but a slightly more sophisticated model may be enough.   
 
Generalized distribution methods. 
 
The beauty of a model is in its simplicity, understandability, and 
manipulability.  For example, the analogy of a coin-flipping exercise to 
the normal distribution is easy for most to grasp.  However, the cost is 
the normal distribution’s naivety; it falls short in fully describing the 
reality of market returns.  There are many probability distributions with 
more than two parameters; Table (1) gives those used to model option-
implied pdfs.  However, the reasoning for why these more robust models 
should be used is seldom explained.  They are chosen simply because 
they allow for more degrees-of-freedom.  The beauty of having only a few 
degrees-of-freedom is lost if no one understands the nature of these few, 
new degrees.  Why not just build a model with many degrees-of-freedom, 
if that is the goal? 
 
Alternative Return-Generating Processes.   
Another method used to add robustness to the standard Black-Scholes 
model is to assume a return-generating process more robust than 
Brownian motion, then find a way to derive a closed-form solution 
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similar to the Black-Scholes equation but with more degrees-of-freedom.  
Factors that Black-Scholes doesn’t address, such as liquidity-risk, time-
varying volatility, and volatility spikes, can correspondingly be modelled 
with time-series components such as stochastic interest rates, stochastic 
volatility, and the Poisson-jump process.   
 
The standard Black-Scholes’ Brownian motion is based on the following 




= 𝑟𝑓𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑊𝑡,      (10) 
 
where 𝑆𝑡  is the underlying security’s price, 𝑟𝑓  is the constant risk-free 
rate, σ is the volatility, and 𝑑𝑊𝑡 is a Wiener process (Brownian motion) 
representing a standard normal distribution (mean of zero and standard 





) = (𝑟𝑓 −
𝜎2
2
) 𝑡 + 𝑁(0, 𝜎√𝑡),     (11) 
 
where 𝑁(0, 𝜎√𝑡) is the normal distribution with mean zero and standard 
deviation 𝜎√𝑡 .  The correction term, −
𝜎2
2
, effectively accounts for the 





Bakshi et al. (1997) introduce a model where the interest rate is not 
constant, but instead has its own stochastic differential equation which 
follows a Vasichek (1977) mean-reverting process: 
 
𝑑𝑟 = 𝜃𝑟(𝜔𝑟 − 𝑟𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑟𝑑𝐵𝑟,𝑡,     (12) 
 
where 𝜔𝑟  is the mean long-term risk-free rate; 𝜃𝑟  the rate of mean-
reversion; 𝜀𝑟  the standard deviation of the risk-free rate process, and 
𝑑𝐵𝑟,𝑡 , like 𝑑𝑊𝑡 , a normal distribution with mean zero and standard 
deviation 𝜀𝑟 .  There is also an assumed constant correlation of 𝜌𝑆,𝑟 
between 𝑑𝐵𝑡 and 𝑑𝑊𝑡.  Equation (12) has a closed-form solution of: 
 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟0 + 𝜃𝑟(𝜔𝑟 − 𝑟0)𝑡 + 𝑁(0, 𝜀𝑟,0√𝑡),    (13) 
 
There are three, new degrees-of-freedom in this model, compared to the 
standard Brownian motion: 𝜃𝑟 , 𝜀𝑟 , and 𝜌𝑆,𝑟.  Each period’s risk-free rate is 
a weighted average of the long-run risk-free rate, 𝜔𝑟 , and the prior 
period’s risk-free rate: 
 




Similar to stochastic interest rates, a number of stochastic volatility 
models have been developed; Heston (1993) being the most popular.  In 
the Heston model volatility is not constant, but instead, the underlying’s 
variance has its own stochastic differential equation which follows a Cox, 
Ingersoll, and Ross (CIR) (1985) mean-reverting process: 
 
𝑑𝑣𝑡
2 = 𝜃𝑣(𝜔𝑣 − 𝑣𝑡
2)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑑𝐵𝑣,𝑡,     (15) 
 
where 𝜔𝑣 is the mean long-term variance, 𝜃𝑣 is the rate of variance mean-
reversion, 𝜀𝑣 is the standard deviation of the variance process, and 𝑑𝐵𝑣,𝑡, 
like 𝑑𝑊𝑡, represents a normal distribution with mean zero and standard 
deviation 𝑣𝑡 .  There is also an assumed constant correlation of 𝜌𝑆,𝑣 
between 𝑑𝐵𝑣,𝑡 and 𝑑𝑊𝑡.  The difference between the CIR mean-reverting 
process and the Vasicek process is that the standard deviation of the CIR 
process is dependent on the most recent volatility of the Brownian 




2 + 𝜃𝑣(𝜔𝑣 − 𝜎0
2)𝑡 + 𝑁(0, 𝜀𝑣𝜎0√𝑡),    (16) 
 
Bates (1996, 2000, 2001) develops a stochastic model which includes a 








where 𝑘  represents the size of jumps and dq a Poisson-counter.  The 
jump-diffusion call option price, 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝐽−𝐷, is an adjustment of the standard 







𝑘=0 ,   (18) 
 
where m is the average jump size, and 𝜆 is the average number of jumps 
per time. 
 
Three degrees-of-freedom can be added with stochastic interest rates, 
another three with stochastic volatility, and two (or more) with jumps; 
however, it is a challenge to get any of these time-series models to 
consistently converge to  statistically-stable parameters; let alone if they 
are combined into a general model.  So, from a practical stand-point, it is 
uncertain which of these time-series components should be chosen to 




Expansion methods start with a simple, known probability distribution 
(usually the normal or log-normal) and then add approximating terms 
similar to a Taylor expansion.  The distribution’s cumulant-generating 
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function’s derivatives determine the distribution’s higher-order moments, 
similar to the way higher-order derivatives of a function are used in a 
Taylor expansion.  This method by no-means guarantees a well-behaved 
distribution (i.e. one whose probabilities are strictly-positive and 
integrate to one).  Table (2) gives the various expansion methods used to 




Yet another method that adds complexity to simple probability 
distributions is to create a weighted-average of two or more simple 
distributions.  For example, Ritchey (1990) averages two normal 
distributions, which results in five degrees-of-freedom: two means, two 
standard deviations, and a single weighting parameter.  Note that the 
result is a complex distribution with a single mean, variance, skewness, 
kurtosis, and a fifth moment.  Melick and Thomas (1997) mix three log-
normal distributions, which results in eight degrees-of-freedom.   
 
Of all the model-based (parametric) methods, the mixture methods are: 
the simplest; easiest-to-understand; and, most-stable and consistently-
statistically estimable; yet, for whatever reason, they are the most seldom 
used methods.  One might even find beauty in the Ritchie model, a 
relatively simple distribution with two, separate spirits of uncertainty, 
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which is surprisingly robust to model samples that would otherwise 




Non-parametric methods embrace the mystery that shrouds option-
implied pdfs.  Instead of treating asset returns as something to be 
modeled with as few degrees-of-freedom as possible, the returns are 
treated as a ‘black-box,’ un-model-able by nature.  The number of 
degrees-of-freedom is not important, so long as the data is not ‘over-fit;’ 
that market micro-structure noise such as bid-ask spreads, sparse 
trading, minimum tick sizes, and the like don’t cause unstable pdf 
estimates. 
 
Table (4) summarizes papers from three non-parametric methods used to 
estimate option-implied pdfs.  The first method, maximum entropy, 
directly embraces the idea of chaos (or a ‘black box’) being a natural part 
of a risk model.  The next two methods fit a curve to the IV smile and 
back out probabilities based on Ross (1976), Breeden and Litzenberger 
(1978), and Banz and Miller (1978), who showed how to extract a pdf 
from a smooth set of option prices. 
 
                                                          
6
 Many have claimed this model graces the heavens as a model of mankind, in the form 
of two fishes (spirits) tied together at the tails -- Pisces -- in the chaotic, wintery quarter 
of the Zodiac, exact opposite of the pure, un-adulterated truth of Virgo. 
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Maximum entropy methods. 
The term entropy was created to describe disorder in thermodynamics.  It 
was later adapted to describe the unknown in information science.  To 
maximize entropy is to minimize assumptions about the unknown.  It is 
usually assumed that if one knows nothing about a probability 
distribution, then all probabilities should be equal (a uniform 
distribution; something rarely found in naturally created distributions).  
The idea is to know what you don’t know, an admirable ambition, and 
pick the distribution that reflects that.   
 
One usually does assume a prior distribution (normal or lognormal), then 
fits the data as close to it as possible based on minimizing the following 
error function: 
 
𝜀 = ∑𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑛 (
𝑝𝑖
𝑎𝑖
),      (19) 
  
where 𝑝𝑖 is the estimated probability and 𝑎𝑖 is the assumed probability.  
It basically amounts to minimizing a weighted average of the error 




Minimizing this function is unstable due to its non-linearity, and the fact 
that the logarithm can balloon to very large positive and/or negative 




Kernel methods sound complicated, but they are basically moving 
average curve-fitting methods.  At each observation along the implied-
volatility smile the current observation is assumed to be the mean of a 
normal distribution that fits the observations around it based on a 
chosen ‘bandwidth,’ which is the standard deviation of that normal 
distribution.  The wider the bandwidth the ‘smoother’ the curve is 
allowed to be.  A small bandwidth creates a ‘tight’ curve that comes close 
to all the points but has much ‘jaggedness.’  A large bandwidth is allowed 
to miss the mean (individual observation) for the sake of ‘smoothness’ of 
the overall curve.   
 
The kernel method is the first method we have inspected that truly 
abandons any assumption of a prior distribution.  The difference 
between it and the next methods we will examine, is that the kernel 
method fits each localized point -- it actually doesn’t need data far away 






If the kernel methods are a bottom-up approach (from each observation), 
the curve fitting methods are a top-down approach (one function to fit all 
the observations).  Before we describe them, it behooves us to show why 
having a smooth set of implied-volatilities is desirable.  The implied-
volatilities are just a transformation of the option prices, transformed 
such that they do not tail off to zero-value when out-of-the-money, but 
are comparable across strike prices. 
 
Ross (1976), Breeden and Litzenberger (1978), and Banz and Miller 
(1978) showed the relation between an asset’s risk-neutral pdf and its 
option prices.  Given the value of a call option,  
 
𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝑒−𝑟𝑡 ∫ (𝑆𝑡 −𝐾)𝜙(𝑆𝑡)
∞
𝐾
𝑑𝑆𝑡,     (20) 
 
where K is the strike price, 𝑆𝑡 is the underlying price, r is the risk-free 
rate, t is the time-to-expiration, and 𝜙(𝑆𝑡) is the risk-neutral pdf;   
 








where Φ (K) is the risk-neutral cumulative distribution function (cdf).  





+ 1,     (22) 
 
and taking the partial derivative with respect to strike K a second time 





.      (23) 
 
A similar derivation (or put-call parity) can be used to find the risk-










.      (25) 
Curve-fitting methods are necessary because options only come at 
discrete strike prices.  They interpolate across the discrete strike prices, 
to create a ‘smooth’ set of continuous option-prices, whereby equations 
(22-25) can be used to calculate the cdf and pdf.  Panel (C) of Table (4) 
summarizes some of the curve-fitting methods used to estimate option-
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implied pdfs.  These curve-fitting methods are fast and stable and have 
become a staple in research using option-implied pdfs7. 
 
THE TAILS OF THE DISTRIBUTION 
 
Of the before-mentioned methodologies for estimating risk-neutral cdfs 
and pdfs, we find rest with two of the methodologies.  If one desires a 
model-based method, the mixture methods are: the simplest; easiest-to-
understand; and, most-stable and consistently-statistically estimable.  If 
one allows for a non-parametric method, the implied-volatility curve-
fitting methods are the fastest and most stable. 
 
However, neither of these methods are particularly good at estimating 
probabilities in the tails of the cdfs and pdfs.  In the case of mixture 
methods, the tails usually revert to one of the simple, inputted 
distributions, which amounts to a normal or log-normal tail; which is 
known, from the Black Scholes volatility-smile, to not be the correct 
shape for most assets’ tails (see Figure (6)).  Curve-fitting methods 
interpolate well between strike prices, but are not intended to extrapolate 
into the tails of the distribution, where there is no tradable, strike-price 
data. 
 
                                                          
7
 See Figlewski (2008) for an example. 
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The tails of the distribution are highly influential on estimates of higher-
order moments of the pdf, such as skewness and kurtosis; and on 
estimates of tail-probabilities, such as those used in value-at-risk (VAR) 
applications.   
 
As a base case, the simplest means to account for the tails is to simply 
truncate them.  The probability of an event occurring outside the 
available range of strikes can be assumed to be zero.  The remaining 
interior distribution can then be re-weighted to force the cdf to sum to 
one.  See Anagnou et al. (2002) for an example of this.  This method is a 
worst-case scenario, i.e. a floor to measure the relative improvement of 
other methods. 
 
The most common means to account for the tails is to assume they are 
normal or log-normal (see Jiang and Tian (2005) for one example).  This 
means a constant Black-Scholes IV for all strikes below the lowest 
observable strike, and a separate constant IV for all strikes above the 
highest observable strike.  But again, the tails are known to be non-
normal. 
 
Theoretically, the Pareto distribution is the correct distribution to model 
the tails of an unknown distribution.  However, it is overly conservative; 
using it often leads to infinite estimates of implied-volatility, or at the very 
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least, wildly unstable estimates.  The methodology used to calculate the 
VIX index shows that empirically this shouldn’t be the case.  Probabilities 
in the tails of the implied-pdf ‘fall’ much faster than the z-scores of the 
underlying’s payoffs ‘rise.’   In other words, the tails aren’t even 
important in calculating implied-volatility; implied-volatility is driven 
primarily by option-prices near-the-money.    
 
Therefore, the Pareto distribution’s cousin, the extreme value distribution 
(EVD) is more commonly used to model the pdf’s tails.  Technically, the 
EVD models the single, most extreme observation of the distribution, not 
the entire tail.  However, it has three degrees-of-freedom, which when 
estimated separately for the low and high tails, is a total of six -- much 
more robust than the Black-Scholes’ two degrees-of-freedom8.    
 
Finally, a new tail-fitting methodology could be introduced based upon 
the same curve-fitting logic used to interpolate between option strikes.  
However instead of interpolating between strikes, the IV smile could be 
used to extrapolate beyond the available range of strikes.  Heuristically, 
the IV smile could be extended to the left and right based on its linear 
trend.  This would provide a non-parametric tail equivalent to the fast 
                                                          
8
 Theoretically, there should only be five degrees of freedom if one knows the forward-
price of the underlying; only four if one also knows its implied-volatility.  Both these 
conditions link the lower tail to the upper tail.  However, there is no known closed-form 
solution or numerical method to assure these conditions.    
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
S&P 500 index option bid-ask quotes with monthly expirations are 
obtained from Optionmetrics through the WRDS system.  Data is 
available from January 1, 2003 thru December 29, 2017.  The risk-free 
rate is interpolated from the zero curve as obtained from Optionmetrics 
which is derived from BBA LIBOR rates and settlement prices of CME 
Eurodollar futures.  The forward price is interpolated from option prices 
(see Appendix 1).   
 
Summary statistics are given in Table (5).  The statistics suggest that the 
spline fit the data well.  At a minimum, five strikes are needed to fit a 
fourth order spline with one knot.  The fewest strikes available were 
eleven.  The average number of strikes available was 68.4 and the 
maximum was 164.  The large number of strikes correlated with a wide 
range of strikes.  The minimum of the cumulative distribution function, 
as obtained only from the spline fitting process (no affixation of tails) 
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averaged 0.0090 with a third quartile of 0.0085.  However there does 
appear to be some outlier days where there were too few strike prices 
available in the lower tail.  The same pattern of outliers appears for the 
range of strikes in the upper tail.  The statistical fit of the spline-fitting 
process was very good: the daily r-squared of the spline regression 




To illustrate the before-mentioned methodologies, this section steps 
through the RND estimation process for a single day. 
 
 Step 1: Sort raw data. 
 
Table (6) provides the raw option price data used to estimate the RND of 
the S&P 500 index on January 31, 2012.  One expiration date is chosen 
to estimate the RND, which for Table 1 is March 17, 2012, which is 46 
days out.  The nearest to expiration date is chosen that is greater than 
two weeks.  The two week buffer follows Figlewski (2009) and is a choice 
of balance: as options approach expiration, the prices of away-from-the-
money options approach zero and fall out of the available range of strike 
prices, making estimation of the tails more difficult; however, longer 




All options used in the analysis are required to have a minimum bid of 
0.05 and the maximum distance allowed between strike prices is 25 
points (if there is a jump in strike prices greater than 25, all options 
further away from at-the-money are dropped).  This eliminates some 
erroneous quotes in the extreme tails of the distribution. 
 
 Step 2: Transform option prices into implied volatilities. 
 
It is easier computationally to work with Black-Scholes IVs rather than 
actual options prices.  Table 1 gives the IV that corresponds to the bid-
ask midpoint based on the Black-Scholes model given the forward price 
(see Black (1976)) 
 
     𝐶 = [𝐹𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐾𝑁(𝑑2)]𝑒
−𝑟𝑓𝑡    (26) 
       






, 𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎√𝑡   (27) 
 
  𝑃 = [𝐾𝑁(−𝑑2) − 𝐹𝑁(−𝑑1)]𝑒
−𝑟𝑓𝑡    (28) 
 
where F is the forward price as obtained from options prices.  The 
forward price is the strike where the call price equals the put price (see 
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Appendix 1 for the details of obtaining the forward price from option 
prices).  Using the forward price has advantages over the traditional 
Black-Scholes model in that the underlying price and its dividend yield 
are not required.  Daily closing prices of the underlying do not 
necessarily line up at the same exact time with closing prices of its 
options, and the dividend yield is not directly observable.  The only data 
besides option prices required in equations (26-28) is the risk-free rate, 
which is interpolated from the LIBOR zero curve. 
 
 Step 3: Fit spline to implied volatility smile. 
 
To interpolate between observable strike prices, a fourth-degree spline 
with a single knot at-the-money is fit to the IV smile.  Figure (8) shows 
the IV smile with both call and put prices.  Following Figlewski (2009), 
put IVs are used for below-the-money strikes and call IVs for above-the-
money, while blending put and call IVs within 3% of at-the-money.  The 
spline is fit to the midpoint of the bid-ask volatility spread.  The bid-ask 
midpoint is preferred to transaction data which is often sparse in options 
markets.  Figure (9) shows the spline fitted to these IVs.  Note that the 
fourth degree spline models the complex shape of the IV smile without 
over-fitting noise in options prices.  
 




Next, the spline is converted back into a dense set of options prices via 
equations (26-28).  Following Figlewski (2009), I build a set of options 
prices at one cent strike intervals.  Then, using equations (22-25), the 
risk-free cumulative distribution and density function can be numerically 
obtained at one cent intervals.  Figure (10) gives the resulting RND 
between the 2nd percentile and 98th percentile.  Note the obvious 
presence of negative skewness. 
 
 Step 5: Affix tails to the distribution. 
 
The above method approximates the RND within the range of available 
strike prices.  However a separate method must be chosen to estimate 
the tails of the distribution, which lie outside of the range of available 
strike prices.  The tails of the distribution are highly influential on 
estimates of higher moments of the RND, such as skewness and 
kurtosis; and on estimates of tail probabilities such as those used in 
value-at-risk applications.  Four potential tail estimation methods are 








As a base case, the simplest tail methodology is to assume a truncated 
distribution.  The probability of an event occurring outside the available 
range of strikes is assumed to be zero.  The remaining interior 
distribution is then reweighted to force the cumulative distribution to 
sum to one.  See Anagnou et al. (2002) for an example of this.  This 
method is included to provide a worst-case scenario, i.e. a floor to 
measure the relative improvement of all other methods. 
 
One assumes there is zero probability of an event occurring outside some 
range, which I choose to be the 2nd and 98th percentiles.  The truncated 
RND then becomes 
 
 𝑓𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑(𝐾) = 𝑓𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑(𝐾)/0.96    (29) 
 
The denominator has to be adjusted if strike prices are not available over 
the entire 2nd to 98th percentile range.  This method is crude, but 
provides a worst-case scenario to compare more complex methods 
against.  Figure 4 displays the difference between the spline-estimated 







The most common method for attaching tails to the distribution is to 
assume they come from the tails of a lognormal distribution (see Jiang 
and Tian (2005) for one example).  This amounts to choosing a constant 
Black-Scholes IV for all strikes below the lowest observable strike, and a 
separate constant IV for all strikes above the highest observable strike.  
These IVs are usually chosen to match the observed IVs at the barriers of 
the IV smile, thus keeping the option price function smooth.  However 
the first and second derivatives of the option price function (representing 
the cumulative probability distribution and density function) usually 
jump at these barriers.  Figure (12) shows an example of this. 
 
Generalized extreme value tails. 
 
Figlewski (2009) attaches tails taken from a Generalized Extreme Value 
distribution (GEV).  Similar to the way the Central Limit Theorem makes 
the normal distribution the natural candidate for modeling a 
distribution’s average, the GEV is the natural candidate for modeling the 
largest value of an unknown distribution.  It has three parameters: a 
location parameter, a scale parameter, and a shape parameter which 




Figlewski attaches GEV tails to the density at the 5th and 95th 
percentiles.  The parameters of the GEV tails are chosen such that the 
GEV and RND have the same cumulative distribution and density 
function at the 5th and 95th percentiles, and also so that the density 
functions match at the 2nd and 98th percentiles.  Namely, for the upper 
tail, 
 
 𝐹𝐺𝐸𝑉(𝐾0.95) = 𝐹𝑅𝑁𝐷(𝐾0.95)     (30) 
 
 𝑓𝐺𝐸𝑉(𝐾0.95) = 𝑓𝑅𝑁𝐷(𝐾0.95)     (31) 
 
 𝑓𝐺𝐸𝑉(𝐾0.98) = 𝑓𝑅𝑁𝐷(𝐾0.98)     (32) 
 
where 𝐾𝑝 is the strike price at the pth percentile.  This gives three degrees 
of freedom to each tail, to match the three parameters within each tail’s 
GEV.  Note that the GEV only models upper tails, and therefore when 
fitting the lower tail of the RND, the cumulative distribution and the 
strike prices must be converted into their upper tail equivalents, namely 
 
 𝐹𝐺𝐸𝑉(−𝐾0.05) = 1 − 𝐹𝑅𝑁𝐷(𝐾0.05)    (33) 
 




 𝑓𝐺𝐸𝑉(−𝐾0.02) = 𝑓𝑅𝑁𝐷(𝐾0.02)     (35) 
 
If the range of available strike prices does not extend to the 2nd and/or 
the 98th percentile, the outermost available percentile is used for 
equation (35) and a percentile three less than that is used for equations 
(33) and (34).  For example, if the highest observable percentile is the 





The new tail-fitting methodology introduced in this thesis is based upon 
the same logic used to interpolate between option strikes.  However 
instead of interpolating between strikes, the IV smile is used to 
extrapolate beyond the available range of strikes.  Bliss and 
Panigirtzoglou (2004) use a similar methodology, however they forces the 
IV smile to become horizontal as strikes go towards zero or infinity.  This 
is essentially equivalent to the lognormal tail methodology.  I propose to 
extrapolate the IV smile based on its linear trend. 
 
Specifically, the IV smile is extended to the left and right based on its 
linear trend between the 2nd and 5th percentiles (for the left tail), and 95th 
and 98th percentiles (for the right tail).  Similar to Figlewski’s method, if 
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the range of available strikes does not extend to the 2nd and/or the 98th 
percentile, the range of three percentiles farthest to the edge of the 
available strike prices is used to capture the linear trend.  Once the IV is 
extrapolated, it is converted back into a dense set of option prices and 
the RND is obtained numerically via equations (22-25).   
 
 
Figure (12) shows the IV smiles that result from the lognormal tails 
method and the smile-extrapolation method.  Between the 5th and 95th 
percentiles, the IV smiles for both methods are based solely off the fitted 
spline.  For the smile-extrapolation method, outside the 2nd and 98th 
percentiles, the smile is based solely off the high and low tail linear 
trends.  Within the trend estimation zones, the smile is a blend of the 
fitted spline and the linear trend. 
 
For the lognormal tails method, tails from a lognormal distribution are 
affixed at the 2nd and 98th percentiles such that the option price function 
remains smooth.  In terms of the volatility smile this amounts to affixing 
a flat line that connects to the fitted spline at the 2nd and 98th 
percentiles, as can be seen in Figure 5.  Note that the right tails are 
nearly identical between the lognormal tail method and the smile-
extrapolation method.  However, the left tails are drastically different as 
the lognormal tail forces the IV smile to take a sharp downward kink, 
which obviously does not reflect the observed option data.  This problem 
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leads to instability when using the lognormal tail method to estimate 
higher moments of the distribution and/or tail probabilities.  The exact 
location of the 2nd and 98th percentiles is affected by market 
imperfections such as the time to maturity of the options.  The smile-
extrapolation method is not nearly as dependent on the exact location of 
the 2nd and 98th percentiles. 
 
Figures (13) and (14) compare the density function and cumulative 
distribution of lower tails that result from the GEV method and the 
smile-extrapolation method.  Within Figure 6, note that the two methods 
are guaranteed to overlap at the 2nd and 5th percentiles, as a result of the 
GEV fitting process.  In Figure (14) the two methods are guaranteed to 
overlap at the 5th percentile.  However, outside of those three points the 
two methods could potentially vary from each other.  That is not the case 
in this particular example though.  The two tails are very similar to each 
other, suggesting that the two tail fitting methods should provide decent 
benchmarks against each other. 
 
TIME SERIES STABILITY TEST 
 
I undertake two empirical tests with aim to identify which method best 
estimates the tails of the distribution.  The time series stability test 
measures the stability of each tail fitting method.  It is important for 
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users of RNDs to know whether changes in moment estimates are due to 
underlying fundamentals or random noise.  For example, central bankers 
have suggested using RNDs to monitor investor sentiment and assess the 
effectiveness of monetary policy actions.  Noisy moment estimates could 
lead to false positive conclusions and poor decision making. 
 
First, time series of the moments generated by each of the methods will 
be graphically depicted and viewed for general stability.  Then the noise 
component of each estimated moment’s time series will be estimated in 
an GARCH(1,1) model.  Since each method estimates the interior of the 
RND the same, any differences in the noise components should be due to 
the tail fitting method.  The most stable tail fitting method should 
generate a noise component will the smallest mean squared error (MSE). 
 
Next, normal probability plots of the noise components will be graphed 
and probability plot correlation coefficients (PPCCs) calculated.  If the 
residuals of the GARCH(1,1) model are truly noise, then the normal 
probability plots should be straight lines with a slope of one.  The PPCC 
measures how close each of the noise components comes to this line.  A 
higher PPCC should indicate a more stable noise component. 
 
Last, cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the noise components 
will be graphed and compared against a normal distribution.  If the 
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residuals of the GARCH(1,1) model are truly noise, then they should 
follow a normal distribution.  Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests will 
measures how close the CDFs of the noise components come to normal 
distribution CDFs.  A lower K-S test statistic indicates a more stable 
noise component. 
 
PRICING ERROR TEST 
 
As a compliment to the stability test, I undertake a pricing error test 
comparing estimated option prices to actual option data.  For a given 
day’s estimated RND, the corresponding option price estimates are 
compared to actual option prices in terms of the root mean squared error 















     (34) 
 
It is common in practice to measure pricing error in terms of Black-
Scholes implied volatilities rather than call or put prices.  Note, that on 
an economic basic, vega (the option-greek measuring the sensitivity of 
the option’s price relative to the option’s implied volatility) gets smaller as 
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the strike price moves away from the money (very small in the tails as 
defined in this thesis).  Therefore, in terms of the tail-option’s price, it is 
difficult to compare the performance of each tail-fitting method.  The 
implied-volatilities much better estimate each tail-fitting method’s 
estimate of the future uncertainty of the underlying asset’s return.   
 
In order to test if the tail estimates are biased above or below the actual 














      (37) 
 
Since the subject of the thesis is the fitting of the distribution’s tails, the 
RND will be estimated without using the entire range of available strike 
prices.  The RMSE, RMSRE, ME, and MRE will be calculated over the 
outer range of strikes -- the strikes not used to estimate the RND.  This 
will identify which estimation method best prices options outside of the 









TIME SERIES STABILITY TEST 
 
Figures (15-18) show time series of the implied volatility, implied 
skewness, and implied kurtosis estimated using the four separate tail 
fitting methods.  At first glance, all four methods appear to generate 
stable estimates of implied volatility.  However the GEV tail method 
produces time periods of highly unstable estimates of implied skewness 
and implied kurtosis.  The truncated tails method also produces a few 
periods of unstable implied skewness and implied kurtosis, but appears 
to produce stable estimates most of the time. 
 
To quantify the stability of each tail estimate, Tables (7-9) give parameter 
estimates of a GARCH(1,1) model for the implied volatility, implied 
skewness, and implied kurtosis times series, respectively.  The MSE of 
the residuals is by far the highest using the GEV tails method for all 
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three implied moments.  Furthermore, the r-squared is by far the lowest 
using the GEV method for all three implied moments.  In terms of MSEs, 
the naïve methods (truncated tails and lognormal tails) produce the most 
stable implied moments, especially for higher order moments.  However, 
this is largely due to the fact that they consistently underestimate the 
higher order moments.  Using r-squared as a criteria instead, the smile-
extrapolated tails method outperforms the naïve methods, especially for 
higher order moments. 
 
Figures (19-21) give normal probability plots for the residuals of each 
GARCH(1,1) model.  If the residuals truly represent random noise, as 
GARCH models assume, then the plots should form a straight line with a 
slope of one.  The probability plot correlation coefficient (PPCC) measures 
the correlation of each probability plot with the ideal straight line.  The 
GEV method generates by far the lowest PPCC for each implied moment.  
It can be seen from the plots that the GEV method produces a residual 
distribution far too heavy-tailed compared to a normal distribution.  
However, the heavy tails do not appear to be driven by outliers.  There is 
some non-random factor causing the GEV method to estimate widely 
fluctuating implied moments.  Surprisingly, for implied kurtosis, the 




Figures (22-24) give the CDF for the residuals of each GARCH(1,1) model.  
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test statistic compares each CDF to its 
ideal normal distribution CDF.  The results are similar to those from the 
normal probability plots. 
 
Note that GARCH models with lags greater than one were also estimated, 
but the results were comparable. 
 
PRICING ERROR TEST 
 
Table (10) gives the general results for the pricing error test.  The 
baseline is set by the truncated tails method, with a ME of -0.3974 (a 
MRE of -100%) and a RMSE of 0.4179 (a RMSRE of -100%).  Note that all 
error estimates use the estimated implied volatility versus the implied 
volatility observed from actual option prices.  It is not surprising that 
estimates have a very large negative bias, as the truncated tail method 
assumes all tail options have a price (and implied volatility) of zero.  All 
other methods greatly improve upon these results. 
 
The normal tail method results in a ME of -0.1498 (ln[-0.1498/-0.3974] = 
a 98% improvement over the baseline) and a RMSE of 0.1721.  The 
relative errors are a MRE of -31.27% and a RMSRE of 33.76%.  Despite 
the massive improvement over the baseline, the normal tail method is 
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still a bit of a straw-man, as it is well-known that implied volatilities 
continue to rise as they move away from the mean of the distribution.  -
31.27% is most likely an unacceptably negative bias for any user of 
option-implied probability distributions. 
 
The robust model-based method, the GEV tails method, results in a ME 
of -0.0152 (-4.54% MRE) and a RMSE of 0.0326 (7.81% RMSRE).  This is 
a (ln[-0.0152/-0.3974]) 326% improvement over the baseline and a (ln[-
0.0152/-0.1498]) 229% improvement over the normal tails method.   
 
The robust non-parametric method, the spline-extrapolated method, 
gives the best pricing error results: a ME of -0.0042 (only -1.57%! MRE) 
and a RMSE of 0.0134 (4.42% RMSRE).  This is a (ln[-0.0042/-0.3974]) 
455% improvement over the baseline, a (ln[-0.0042/-0.1498]) 357% 
improvement over the normal tails method, and a (ln[-0.0042/-0.0152]) 
129% improvement over the GEV method.   
 
Tables (11-12) give results for just the lower and upper tail respectively.  
Generally, relative results are the same between methods as in Table 
(10).  It is difficult to summarize general results between the lower and 
upper tail estimates.  ME and RMSE are generally better for the upper 
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tail, but MRE and RMSRE are generally better for the lower tail.  This is 
understandable, as option-implied probability distributions are typically 
negatively skewed, meaning higher implied volatilities (and higher ME) in 
the lower tail, and there is typically option strikes that go much farther 










This thesis builds on and contributes to work in the field of financial risk 
management, specifically option-implied probability distributions.  
Although a number of studies have examined estimating the middle 
portion of probability distributions, there has not been a strong focus on 
the tails of the distribution, which are of particular importance in a risk 
management setting.  As such, this study provides additional insights 
about these tails, by horseracing four different tail-fitting methods.  This 
research differs from previous studies by introducing a new, non-
parametric, heuristic tail-fitting method that is similar in methodology to 
the consensus, most-often used method to estimate the middle portion of 
the probability distribution; and, by identifying which tail fitting method 
produces the most stable estimate with the least tail-option pricing error. 
 
Four tail-fitting methods are examined.  First (1), a base-case is laid 
down assuming truncated tails.  The middle of the distribution is 
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estimated using the popular curve-fitting method, where a fourth-degree 
spline with a single knot at-the-money is fit to the implied-volatility 
smile.  This same method is used to estimate the middle portion of the 
distribution for all four tail-fitting methods.  In the truncated tails case, 
the distribution is then truncated at the 2nd and 98th percentiles, with 
the middle portion reweighted to sum to 100%.  This method produces 
the maximum possible tail-option pricing error, as it assumes all options 
below the 2nd percentile and above the 98th percentile are worthless, 
which they never are in practice.  This produces a mean error of -0.3974 
(measured as the difference between the estimated implied volatility and 
the actual implied volatility from observed option prices) and a root mean 
squared error of 0.4179.  All other methods will improve beyond these 
baselines.  Despite its poor pricing ability, the truncated tails method 
does produce one of the most stable distribution estimates (as measured 
by a GARCH model of the time-series of the distribution’s moments). 
 
The second (2) tail-fitting method assumes normally distributed tails 
beyond the 2nd and 98th percentiles.  This method is also a bit of a straw-
man, as it is well-known that implied volatilities continue to rise as the 
strike price gets further away from the mean of the distribution.  
However, in practice, normally distributed tails are one of the most 
commonly used methods by researchers.  This methodology produces 
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distributions on an order equal in stability to the truncated tails method, 
but also produces poor pricing error results.  The mean error is -0.1489 
(a mean relative error of -31.27%) and the root mean squared error is 
0.1721 (a root mean squared relative error of 33.76%).  These are 
massive improvements over the truncated tails method, but still 
relatively poor compared to the final two methods. 
 
The third and fourth methods are not at all straw-men arguments and 
are designed to generate the best possible model-based estimate of the 
tails, and the best possible non-parametric, heuristic estimate of the 
tails.  The third (3) method assumes generalized extreme value (GEV) 
distributed tails beyond the 2nd and 98th percentiles.  Generalized Pareto 
distributed tails were also examined and the results were similar to the 
GEV tails.  This method greatly improves pricing error.  It produced a 
mean error of -0.0152 (a mean relative error of -4.54%) and a root mean 
squared error of 0.0326 (a root mean squared relative error of 7.81%).  
However, the estimated distributions are much less stable than the two 
naïve methods, on an order of magnitude of three to four times less 
stable.  This means, that while the average estimate of the distribution is 
closer to the actual, observed option-implied distribution, the estimation 
varies widely from day-to-day, giving users of the estimated distribution 




The fourth (4) and last method uses an implied-volatility curve-fitting 
method to fit the tails beyond the 2nd and 98th percentiles.  This method 
assumes no pre-determined parameterization of the tails, and is similar 
to the fast and stable curve-fitting methodology used to fit the middle 
portion of the distribution.  Instead of interpolating between observable 
strike prices, the implied volatility smile is used to extrapolate beyond 
observable strike prices, into the tails of the distribution.  It produces the 
best pricing error results: a mean error of -0.0042 (a mean relative error 
of only -1.57%) and a root mean squared error of 0.0134 (a root mean 
squared relative error of 4.52%).  Also, this method is on an order of 
magnitude equal in stability to the two naïve methods. 
 
In short, the non-parameterized, heuristic method, similar to the fast 
and stable method most commonly used to estimate the middle portion 
of the probability distribution, is also stable, with the least option pricing 
bias in the tails of the distribution.  Researchers and other users of 
option-implied probability distributions would be wise to use the spline-
extrapolation method used in this thesis, or other non-parameterized, 




This thesis focused on determining whether a model-based or a non-
parameterized method is best at estimating the tails of the option-implied 
probability distribution.  Results confidently favor the latter.  Future 
research might focus on determining the best possible non-
parameterized method, or use a non-parameterized method to continue 
research along the three lines of applications outlined in Table (1).   
 
Option-implied probability distributions are still a burgeoning area of 
research and application in financial risk management.  I am confident of 
their utility and continued growth in use, and rest assured this thesis 
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Appendix 1: Obtaining the Forward Price from Options Prices 
Throughout the RND estimation process it is necessary to convert back 
and forth between option prices and their equivalent Black-Scholes IVs.  
The traditional Black-Scholes model requires as input the underlying 
asset’s price and dividend yield.  Optionmetrics provides estimates of 
these but they are problematic.  One solution is to use equation (11), 
which takes as input the forward price in place of the underlying price 
and dividend yield.  Fortunately, given a full set of option prices, the 
forward price can easily be found.  It is the strike price where the put 
price equals the call price.   
 
However, strikes prices come in discrete intervals and the exact strike 
which equates the put and call price is likely to be between two 
observable strikes.  In order to pinpoint the forward price, option prices 
need to be interpolated between the strikes.   
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The process is threefold: first fit a spline to the IV smile derived only from 
put prices; then fit a spline to the IV smile derived only from call options; 
and last, convert both splines back into option prices and find where the 
put price function intersects with the call price function.  One 
adjustment must be made to spline fitting process: when converting 
between option prices and IVs via equation (11), the forward price cannot 
be used as an input because it has not been estimated yet.  To overcome 
this, the underlying asset price, as quoted by Optionmetrics is used in 
place of the forward price.  Since the IV smile is only used as a 
computational tool, it does not matter what forward value is used to 
calculate IVs, so long as the same value is used to convert back to option 
prices.  The quoted underlying price is close enough to the forward price 
that it can be used as a proxy. 
 
Figures 15 and 16 show this process for the set of options prices used in 
the illustrative example from the thesis.  Figure 15 gives the fitted splines 
for puts and calls separately.  Note that the IV smiles in Figure 15 do not 
match the IV smile in Figure 1.  This is because an incorrect forward 
price was used in Figure 15, which would be a problem if one spline was 
being fit to both puts and calls (as in Figure 2), but is of no consequence 
when fitting only puts or calls separately.  Figure 16 shows the splines 
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converted back into option price space and the intersection of the two 
splines, which is the estimated forward price.    
 
 
Appendix 2: Extracting Moments from the Estimated Distribution 
 
The implied moments (IM) centered about the forward price, as displayed 
in Figure 8 are determined by the following equations 
 
 (17)   𝐼𝑀2 = √∑ [𝑓(𝐾) ∗ 0.01 ∗ (𝐾 − 𝐹)2]𝐾    
 
(18)   𝐼𝑀3 =




(19)   𝐼𝑀4 =




where 𝐼𝑀2  is implied volatility un-scaled by the forward price, 𝐼𝑀3  is 
implied skewness, 𝐼𝑀4 is implied kurtosis, F is the option-implied forward 
price, and 𝑓(𝐾)  is the RND at strike K.  Note that implied volatility 
= 𝐼𝑀2 𝐹⁄ .  As explained in section 2.4.4, the RND is calculated at one cent 
intervals, and therefore (17)-(19) should ideally be summed at one cent 
intervals over the entire range of strike prices.  But what constitutes the 
entire range of strikes?  The moments could be summed from a zero 
strike price up to some assuredly large strike price such as two times the 




If the range of strikes used to calculate (17)-(19) is not wide enough, the 
IMs may not converge to a stable estimate, and the IMs will fluctuate 
widely from one day to the next.  To illustrate this see Figure 17.  It 
depicts each one cent strike’s contribution to the summation in equation 
(19).  As the strike price goes to zero or infinity, the graph tends toward 
zero, because the RND tends to zero.  However, if too narrow a range of 
strikes is used to calculate equation (19), the graph will not tend to zero, 
and the implied kurtosis estimate will not converge.  In the case of the 
day chosen for Figure 17, the low end of the range approaches zero at a 
strike price around 350, which means the left tail of the distribution 
must be extrapolated to this strike. 
 
In this thesis I widen the range of strikes until 𝑓(𝐾) ∗ 0.01 ∗ (𝐾 − 𝐹)4  is 
less than 5% of its maximum value.  This insures that implied kurtosis 
converges to a stable estimate.  In the case of Figure 17, its highest value 
is 9,113.42, and therefore the range of strikes is widened until the graph 
drops below 455.67 both on the high and low side.  Note that since the 
limit of (𝐾 − 𝐹)4 tends toward infinity faster than (𝐾 − 𝐹)3 tends toward 
+/-infinity, implied skewness always converges within a tighter range 
than implied kurtosis.  By the same reasoning implied volatility 
converges within a tighter range than implied skewness.  Therefore, by 
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insuring that implied kurtosis converges, this also insures that implied 




Table 1. Applications of Option-Implied PDFs       
 
Panel A:  Central Bank Research involving Option-Implied PDFs 
 
  Author (Year)    Central Bank 
 
Neuhaus (1995)    Deutsche Bundesbank 
Leahy and Thomas (1996)  Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
Melick and Thomas (1997)  Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
Bahra (1997)    Bank of England 
Abken and Ramamurtie (1996) Federal Reserve of Atlanta 
Malz (1997)     Federal Reserve of New York 
Nakamura and Shiratsuka (1999) Bank of Japan 
McManus and Watt (1999)  Bank of Canada 
Coutant et al. (2001)   Banque de France 
Andersen and Wagener (2002)  European Central Bank 
 
Panel B:  Event Studies using Option-Implied PDFs 
 
  Author (Year)    Event 
 
Bates (1991, 2000)   Black Monday, Oct. 1987 
Melick and Thomas (1997)   Crude oil prices, first Gulf War 
Gemmill and Seflekos (1999)  FTSE 100, crashes and elections 
Söderlind (2000)    UK Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis 
Jondeau and Rockinger (2000) French snap election, 1997 
Shiratsuka (2001)    Japanese boom and bust, 80’s/90’s 
Andersen and Wagener (2002)  Euribor rates, Sept. 11th, 2001 
Campa, Chang and Refalo (2002) Brazilian Real Plan, 1994-1999 
 
Panel C:  Implied Risk Aversion 
 
  Author (Year)   Risk-Neutral / Historical Model 
 
Ait-Sahalia and Lo (1998, 2000) Kernel methods for both 
Coutant (2000)    Hermite polynomial /ARCH 
Haynes and Shin (2002)   Cubic spline / GARCH 
Perignon and Villa (2002)  Kernel methods for both 
Rosenberg and Engle (2002)  Curve fitting / GARCH 




Table 2. Generalized Distributions Used to Model Option-Implied PDFs  
 
  Author (Year)     Distribution 
 
Sherrick et al. (1992, 1995, 1996):  Burr Type-XII  
 Aparicio and Hodges (1998):   Beta of the Second Kind 
Posner and Milevsky (1998):    Tukey’s Lambda  
DeJong and Huisman (2000):    Skewed-Student-t 
Corrado (2001):      Johnson’s 𝑆𝑈 




Table 3. Expansion Methods Used to Model Option-Implied PDFs   
 
  Author (Year)     Expansion Method 
 
Jarrow and Rudd (1982):   Edgeworth  
Longstaff (1995):     Edgeworth  
Corrado and Su (1996, 1997):   Gram–Charlier  
Abken et al. (1996a, 1996b):   Hermite Polynomial 
Abadir and Rockinger (1997):    Confluent Hypergeometric 
Brenner and Eom (1997):   Laguerre Polynomials   
Potters et al. (1998):    Edgeworth 
Jondeau and Rockinger (2001):  Hermite Poly./Gram–Charlier 
Young et al. (2001):    Edgeworth 
Giamouridis and Tamvakis (2001, 2002): Edgeworth 




Table 4. Non-Parametric Methods used to Estimate Option-Implied PDFs  
 
 Panel A:  Maximum Entropy Methods 
 
  Author (Year)    Prior Distribution 
 
Rubinstein (1994)    Lognormal Prior 
Buchen and Kelly (1996)   Uniform and Lognormal Prior 
Stutzer (1996)     Historical Distribution Prior 
Branger (2002)     Multiple Distribution Priors 
Rockinger and Jondeau (2002) Normal & t-Distribution Priors 
 
 Panel B:  Kernel Methods 
 
  Author (Year)    Description 
 
Rookley (1997)    In strike ad time-to-expiration 
Aït-Sahalia and Lo (1998)   In stock price, strike, maturity, 
 interest rate, and dividends 
Bondarenko (2000)    Convolution of kernel & std. densities 
Härdle and Yatchew (2002)  Non-parametric least squares 
 
 Panel C:  Curve-Fitting Methods 
 
  Author (Year)    Description 
 
Shimko  (1993)    Quadratic polynomial 
Mayhew  (1995)    Cubic Spline 
Aparicio and Hodges  (1998)  Cubic B-Splines 
Campa, Chang, and Reider  (1998) Cubic Splines 
Rosenberg  (1998, 2003)  Biv.-polynomials fitted to Log-IV  
Brown and Toft  (1999)   Seventh-Order Splines 
Andersen and Wagener  (2002) High-Order Splines 
Hayes and Shin  (2002)   Cubic Splines 
Rosenberg and Engle  (2002)  Polynomials Fitted to Log-IV 




Table 5: Summary Statistics 
              
Option data from Januray 1, 2003 to December 29, 2017.  Forward price derived from option 
price (see Appendix 1).  CDF and spline fitting statistics based of a fourth degree spline fit to the 
implied volatility smile. 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Q1 Median Q3 Max. 
S&P 500 Index 
 
1,185.93  
    
178.73  













    
181.29  










Risk-Free Rate 2.18% 1.95% 0.16% 0.27% 1.34% 4.11% 6.09% 
Days to Expiration 39.1 6.4 15.0 34.0 39.3 44.0 52.0 
Number of Options 
Used 
          Puts Used 66.1 44.7 8.0 27.0 48.0 113.0 165.0 
   Calls Used 54.0 28.3 10.0 27.0 53.0 76.0 164.0 
   Total Strikes Used 68.4 42.0 11.0 29.0 58.0 110.0 164.0 
Minimum of CDF 0.0090 0.0189 0.0000 0.0018 0.0041 0.0085 0.3345 
Maximum of CDF 0.9864 0.0333 0.4928 0.9850 0.9940 0.9998 1.0000 
Spline Fitting 
          Standard Error 0.0227 0.0171 0.0013 0.0107 0.0175 0.0295 0.1353 
   R-squared 0.9990 0.0013 0.9742 0.9988 0.9994 0.9997 1.0000 





Table 6: Raw Option Price Data 
              
Obtained from S&P Index options on Jan. 31, 2012 with an expiration date of Mar. 17, 2012 
(time to expiration = 46 days).  Underlying price = 1,312.41.  Forward = 1,308.86.  Implied 
volatilities (IV) are obtained from the Black-Scholes option pricing model using forward prices. 
 
 
  Calls Puts 
Strike     Ask Bid Mid IV     Ask Bid Mid IV   
750                 0.10 0.05 0.075 0.532   
775   
     
  
 
0.15 0.05 0.100 0.516 
 780                 0.15 0.05 0.100 0.510   
800   
     
  
 
0.15 0.05 0.100 0.487 
 825                 0.20 0.10 0.150 0.476   
840   
     
  
 
0.40 0.05 0.225 0.478 
 850                 0.40 0.10 0.250 0.472   
860   
     
  
 
0.40 0.05 0.225 0.455 
 870                 0.45 0.05 0.250 0.449   
875   
     
  
 
0.40 0.05 0.225 0.438 
 880                 0.45 0.10 0.275 0.442   
895   
     
  
 
0.50 0.10 0.300 0.429 
 900                 0.45 0.25 0.350 0.430   
905   
     
  
 
0.50 0.15 0.325 0.421 
 910                 0.55 0.15 0.350 0.419   
915   
     
  
 
0.55 0.15 0.350 0.413 
 920                 0.55 0.20 0.375 0.411   
925   
     
  
 
0.55 0.20 0.375 0.405 
 930                 0.60 0.25 0.425 0.405   
940   
     
  
 
0.65 0.25 0.450 0.397 
 950                 0.70 0.30 0.500 0.390   
960   
     
  
 
0.80 0.30 0.550 0.384 
 975                 0.90 0.55 0.725 0.380   
980   
     
  
 
0.95 0.45 0.700 0.373 
 985                 1.00 0.40 0.700 0.367   
990   
     
  
 
1.10 0.55 0.825 0.369 
 995                 1.15 0.55 0.850 0.365   
1000   
     
  
 
1.00 0.65 0.825 0.358 
 1005                 1.30 0.55 0.925 0.358   
1010   
     
  
 
1.35 0.60 0.975 0.355 
 1015                 1.40 0.60 1.000 0.350   
1020   
     
  
 
1.50 0.85 1.175 0.353 
 1025                 1.40 0.75 1.075 0.342   
1030   
     
  
 
1.60 1.00 1.300 0.346 
 1035                 1.75 0.75 1.250 0.338   
1040   
     
  
 
1.70 1.00 1.350 0.336 
 1045                 1.95 1.00 1.475 0.335   
1050   
     
  
 
1.55 1.10 1.325 0.323 
 1055                 2.10 1.50 1.800 0.335   
1060   
     
  
 




1065                 2.30 1.15 1.725 0.320   
1070   
     
  
 
2.40 1.25 1.825 0.317 
 1075                 2.50 1.65 2.075 0.318   
1080   
     
  
 
2.60 1.75 2.175 0.315 
 1085                 2.80 1.50 2.150 0.308   
1090   
     
  
 
2.85 1.60 2.225 0.303 
 1095                 3.00 1.95 2.475 0.303   
1100   
     
  
 
2.70 1.85 2.275 0.292 
 1105                 3.30 1.90 2.600 0.293   
1110   
     
  
 
3.40 2.05 2.725 0.290 
 1115                 3.60 2.20 2.900 0.287   
1120   
     
  
 
3.70 2.65 3.175 0.286 
 1125                 3.90 2.85 3.375 0.283   
1130   
     
  
 
4.00 3.00 3.500 0.279 
 1135                 4.30 3.20 3.750 0.277   
1140   
     
  
 
4.50 3.10 3.800 0.271 
 1145                 4.70 3.60 4.150 0.270   
1150   
     
  
 
4.50 3.80 4.150 0.263 
 1155                 5.30 3.80 4.550 0.262   
1160   
     
  
 
5.40 4.00 4.700 0.257 
 1165                 5.80 4.30 5.050 0.255   
1170   
     
  
 
6.10 4.60 5.350 0.252 
 1175                 6.50 5.00 5.750 0.250   
1180   
     
  
 
6.40 5.60 6.000 0.246 
 1185                 7.20 5.90 6.550 0.245   
1190   
 
127.20 124.10 125.650 0.236   
 
7.60 6.10 6.850 0.240 
 1195     122.70 119.50 121.100 0.233     8.00 6.60 7.300 0.238   
1200   
 
118.10 115.00 116.550 0.230   
 
8.60 7.00 7.800 0.235 
 1205     113.60 110.50 112.050 0.228     9.00 7.60 8.300 0.232   
1210   
 
109.10 106.00 107.550 0.225   
 
9.50 8.10 8.800 0.229 
 1215     104.70 101.60 103.150 0.222     10.20 8.60 9.400 0.226   
1220   
 
99.90 97.20 98.550 0.218   
 
10.80 9.20 10.000 0.223 
 1225     96.50 92.70 94.600 0.219     11.40 10.00 10.700 0.221   
1230   
 
91.60 88.60 90.100 0.214   
 
12.20 10.70 11.450 0.218 
 1235     87.40 84.40 85.900 0.212     12.90 11.30 12.100 0.214   
1240   
 
83.20 80.20 81.700 0.209   
 
13.70 12.10 12.900 0.211 
 1245     79.50 75.90 77.700 0.207     14.60 12.90 13.750 0.208   
1250   
 
74.90 72.10 73.500 0.204   
 
15.60 13.90 14.750 0.206 
 1255     70.90 68.10 69.500 0.201     16.60 14.90 15.750 0.203   
1260   
 
66.90 64.20 65.550 0.199   
 
17.70 15.90 16.800 0.200 
 1265     63.50 60.10 61.800 0.197     18.70 17.10 17.900 0.197   
1270   
 
59.70 56.50 58.100 0.194   
 
20.00 18.40 19.200 0.195 
 1275     55.50 52.90 54.200 0.191     21.20 19.60 20.400 0.192   
1280   
 
52.30 49.10 50.700 0.189   
 
22.60 21.00 21.800 0.189 
 1285     48.70 45.80 47.250 0.186     24.20 22.50 23.350 0.187   
1290   
 
45.20 42.20 43.700 0.183   
 
25.60 24.00 24.800 0.183 
 1295     41.80 39.10 40.450 0.180     27.30 25.70 26.500 0.181   
1300   
 
38.60 35.90 37.250 0.178   
 
29.20 27.00 28.100 0.177 
 1305     35.40 32.80 34.100 0.175     31.20 28.60 29.900 0.173   
1310   
 
31.60 30.00 30.800 0.170   
 
33.30 30.60 31.950 0.171 
 1315     29.60 27.00 28.300 0.170     35.30 33.50 34.400 0.170   
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1320   
 
26.30 24.40 25.350 0.166   
 
37.60 35.70 36.650 0.167 
 1325     23.50 21.90 22.700 0.163     40.20 38.10 39.150 0.164   
1330   
 
21.10 19.30 20.200 0.160   
 
42.80 40.70 41.750 0.162 
 1335     18.90 17.10 18.000 0.157     45.70 43.50 44.600 0.160   
1340   
 
16.80 15.10 15.950 0.155   
 
48.40 46.20 47.300 0.157 
 1345     14.90 13.20 14.050 0.153     51.50 49.20 50.350 0.154   
1350   
 
12.90 11.40 12.150 0.150   
 
54.70 52.40 53.550 0.152 
 1355     11.20 9.80 10.500 0.148               
1360   
 
9.90 8.40 9.150 0.147   
      1365     8.50 7.00 7.750 0.144               
1370   
 
7.20 5.90 6.550 0.142   
      1375     6.00 4.90 5.450 0.140               
1380   
 
5.20 4.30 4.750 0.140   
      1385     4.50 3.40 3.950 0.138               
1390   
 
3.80 2.80 3.300 0.137   
      1395     3.10 2.35 2.725 0.136               
1400   
 
2.65 2.10 2.375 0.137   
      1405     2.30 1.60 1.950 0.136               
1410   
 
1.85 1.30 1.575 0.134   
      1415     1.60 1.10 1.350 0.135               
1420   
 
1.35 0.90 1.125 0.135   
      1425     1.15 0.75 0.950 0.135               
1430   
 
1.00 0.60 0.800 0.135   
      1435     0.85 0.45 0.650 0.135               
1440   
 
0.80 0.40 0.600 0.138   
      1445     0.70 0.30 0.500 0.138               
1450   
 
0.65 0.25 0.450 0.140   
      1460     0.55 0.15 0.350 0.142               
1475   
 
0.50 0.15 0.325 0.152   





Table 7: Time Series Stability Test, Implied Volatility 
                   
Table gives parameter and standard error estimates for an GARCH(1,1) regression of the following form: 
 
𝐼?̂?0 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑉−1 + 𝜀 
 
𝜀?̂?𝑉0
2 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜀−1
2 + 𝛽2𝜀?̂?𝑉−1
2 + 𝑧 
 
where IV is the implied volatility as estimated using the four tail-fitting procedures.  The risk-neutral density (RND) within the observable range of 
strike prices (between the tails) is estimated in all four cases using the spline-fitting method of Figlewski (2009).  Numbers in parenthesis are standard 
errors.  ***, **, and * represent two-sided tests that the parameters are different than zero at the 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively.  
MSE is mean squared error.  PPCC is the probability plot correlation coefficient and K-S is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic, with stars 
representing 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels that the distribution of the standardized residuals is different than the normal.   
 
  Truncated  Lognormal  GEV  Spline-Extrapolated  
  Tails  Tails  Tails  Tails  
          
𝛼0  0.1897***  0.2568***  0.2007***  0.2475***  
  (0.0254)  (0.0565)  (0.006548)  (0.0531)  
          
𝛼1  -0.9957***  -0.9964***  -0.9854***  -0.9969***  
  (0.002044)  (0.002023)  (0.002836)  (0.001847)  

















          
𝛽1  0.1229***  0.1308***  0.3068***  0.1307***  
  (0.007384)  (0.00973)  (0.0132)  (0.009256)  
          
𝛽2  0.8592***  0.8410***  0.7033***  0.8482***  
  (0.007734)  (0.0102)  (0.008205)  (0.009739)  
          
MSE  0.0001483  0.0001943  0.0005000  0.0001876  
𝑟2  0.9743  0.9750  0.9333  0.9743  
PPCC  0.9217***  0.9240***  0.8523***  0.9232***  
K-S  0.1300***  0.1278***  0.1774***  0.1305***  
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Table 8: Time Series Stability Test, Implied Skewness 
                   
Table gives parameter and standard error estimates for an GARCH(1,1) regression of the following form: 
 
𝐼?̂?0 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑆−1 + 𝜀 
 
𝜀?̂?𝑆0
2 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜀−1
2 + 𝛽2𝜀?̂?𝑆−1
2 + 𝑧 
 
where IS is the implied skewness as estimated using the four tail-fitting procedures.  The risk-neutral density (RND) within the observable range of 
strike prices (between the tails) is estimated in all four cases using the spline-fitting method of Figlewski (2009).  Numbers in parenthesis are standard 
errors.  ***, **, and * represent two-sided tests that the parameters are different than zero at the 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively.  
MSE is mean squared error.  PPCC is the probability plot correlation coefficient and K-S Statistic is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic, with stars 
representing 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels that the distribution of the standardized residuals is different than the normal.   
 
  Truncated  Lognormal  GEV  Spline-Extrapolated  
  Tails  Tails  Tails  Tails  
          
𝛼0  -0.6245***  -1.1027***  -1.2198***  -1.1084***  
  (0.009467)  (0.0333)  (0.0611)  (0.0500)  
          
𝛼1  -0.8497***  -0.9538***  -0.9387***  0.9692***  
  (0.006639)  (0.00531)  (0.008041)  (0.004005)  
          
𝛽0  0.00302 ***  0.000311***  0.002793***  0.000132***  
  (0.0000148)  (0.0000556)  (0.000205)  (0.0000292)  
          
𝛽1  0.1597***  0.1085***  0.5149***  0.0682***  
  (0.006149)  (0.0116)  (0.0131)  (0.008270)  
          
𝛽2  0.8577***  0.8427***  0.6687***  0.9113***  
  (0.002034)  (0.0174)  (0.003354)  (0.0101)  
          
MSE  0.02041  0.00657  0.46235  0.00759  
𝑟2  0.7078  0.9084  0.3426  0.9445  
PPCC  0.8410***  0.9912***  0.8539***  0.9924***  
K-S   0.1835***  0.0429***  0.1876***  0.0465***  
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Table 9: Time Series Stability Test, Implied Kurtosis 
                   
Table gives parameter and standard error estimates for an GARCH(1,1) regression of the following form: 
 
𝐼?̂?0 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝐾−1 + 𝜀 
 
𝜀?̂?𝐾0
2 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜀−1
2 + 𝛽2𝜀?̂?𝐾−1
2 + 𝑧 
 
where IK is the implied kurtosis as estimated using the four tail-fitting procedures.  The risk-neutral density (RND) within the observable range of 
strike prices (between the tails) is estimated in all four cases using the spline-fitting method of Figlewski (2009).  Numbers in parenthesis are standard 
errors.  ***, **, and * represent two-sided tests that the parameters are different than zero at the 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively.  
MSE is mean squared error.  PPCC is the probability plot correlation coefficient and K-S Statistic is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic, with stars 
representing 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels that the distribution of the standardized residuals is different than the normal.   
 
  Truncated  Lognormal  GEV  Spline-Extrapolated  
  Tails  Tails  Tails  Tails  
          
𝛼0  3.1047***  4.3736***  4.2274***  5.0639***  
  (0.0226)  (0.0957)  (0.3252)  (0.2562)  
          
𝛼1  -0.9047***  -0.9486***  -0.9448***  -0.9692***  
  (0.006817)  (0.006758)  (0.0161)  (0.003972)  
          
𝛽0  0.002234***  0.001700***  0.0113***  0.001748***  
  (0.000159)  (0.00315)  (0.001974)  (0.000339)  
          
𝛽1  0.2267***  0.1399***  0.6231***  0.1097***  
  (0.0138)  (0.0117)  (0.0143)  (0.009275)  
          
𝛽2  0.7196***  0.8267***  0.7034***  0.8990***  
  (0.0113)  (0.0112)  (0.002273)  (0.007449)  
          
MSE  0.02867  0.06425  76.47863  0.53036  
𝑟2  0.7820  0.8648  0.1907  0.9034  
PPCC  0.9466***  0.9742***  0.8162***  0.9232***  
K-S   0.1024***  0.0653***  0.2317***  0.1028***  
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Table 10: Pricing Error Test 
                   
























  ME MRE RMSE RMSRE 
      
Truncated   -0.3974 -1.0000 0.4179 1.0000 
Tails  [-0.4056, -0.3913] [-1.0000, -1,0000] [0.4037, 0.4359] [1.0000, 1.0000] 
      
Lognormal  -0.1338 -0.2852 0.1601 0.3182 
Tails  [-0.1376, -0.1264] [-0.2936, -0.2769] [0.1532, 0.1668] [0.3053, 0.3318] 
      
GEV  -0.0152 -0.0454 0.03258 0.0781 
Tails  [-0.0175, -0.0142] [-0.0500, -0.0424] [0.0313, 0.0337] [0.0770, 0.0834] 
      
Spline-Extrapolated  -0.0042 -0.0157 0.0134 0.0442 
Tails  [-0.0053, -0.0036] [-0.0189, -0.0143] [0.0127, 0.1468] [0.0432, 0.0459] 
      
      




Table 11: Pricing Error Test: Lower Tail Only 
                   
























  ME MRE RMSE RMSRE 
      
Truncated   -0.4363 -1.0000 0.4452 1.0000 
Tails  [-0.4429, -0.4317] [-1.0000, -1,0000] [0.4296, 0.4669] [1.0000, 1.0000] 
      
Lognormal  -0.1498 -0.3127 0.1721 0.3376 
Tails  [-0.1556, -0.1491] [-0.3349, -0.3049] [0.1638, 0.1811] [0.3257, 0.3558] 
      
GEV  -0.0156 -0.0327 0.0329 0.0646 
Tails  [-0.0175, -0.0138] [-0.0369, -0.0301] [0.0323, 0.0352] [0.0623, 0.0679] 
      
Spline-Extrapolated  -0.0029 -0.0063 0.0122 0.0263 
Tails  [-0.0036, -0.0024] [-0.0084, -0.0054] [0.0133, 0.0124] [0.0258, 0.0280] 
      




Table 12: Pricing Error Test: Upper Tail Only 
                   
























  ME MRE RMSE RMSRE 
      
Truncated   -0.1664 -1.0000 0.1671 1.0000 
Tails  [-0.1687, -0.1637] [-1.0000, -1,0000] [0.1514, 0.1864] [1.0000, 1.0000] 
      
Lognormal  -0.0194 -0.1103 0.0248 0.1348 
Tails  [-0.0217, -0.0170] [-0.1255, -0.0981] [0.0216, 0.0272] [0.1213, 0.1515] 
      
GEV  -0.0209 -0.1203 0.0246 0.1382 
Tails  [-0.0229, -0.0189] [-0.1305, -0.1101] [0.0226, 0.0278] [0.1254, 0.1545] 
      
Spline-Extrapolated  -0.0143 -0.0803 0.0185 0.1023 
Tails  [-0.0162, -0.0125] [-0.0901, -0.0706] [0.0167, 0.0207] [0.0925, 0.1147] 
      
      





Figure 1.  Binomial Option Pricing Model       
 




𝐵𝑡 = price of a risk-free bond at time t 𝐶0 = call price 
𝑝𝑈 = probability there is an upward return 𝑈 = 𝑒
𝑟𝑡+𝜎√𝑡 
𝑆𝑡 = underlying share price 1 𝑈⁄ = 𝑒
𝑟𝑡−𝜎√𝑡 
𝐾  = strike price 𝑟𝑓 = risk-free rate. 




Figure 2.  Multi-Period Binomial versus Black-Scholes     
 








Figure 3.  S&P 500 Options at the CBOE       
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Figure 4.  Z-Score of Daily S&P 100 Returns around Black Monday, 1987  
 
 
              


























































Figure 5.  CBOE VIX Index and S&P 500 Index       
 
 
              




Figure 6.  Black-Scholes Vol. Smile for Various Assets on Dec. 29th, 2017   













 Assumptions:  𝑆0 = $100, 𝐾 = $105, 𝑟𝑓 = 5%, 𝑡 = 1, 𝐶0 = $14.50 
 
 Value of Call: 𝐶0 = 𝑝𝑈
𝑄 (𝑆0𝑒




−𝑟𝑓𝑡)   
  
  where, 𝑈 = 𝑒𝜎√𝑡, 𝐷 = 1/𝑈 
 
 Therefore:  $14.50 =
1−𝐷
𝑈−𝐷
($100𝑈 − $105𝑒−5%) 
 
 Which implies: 𝑈 = 1.34, 𝐷 = 0.75, 𝑝𝑈
𝑄 = 42.8%, 𝑝𝐷





 Assumption: 𝑟 = 12%   (required return of the stock) 
 







 Which implies: 𝑝𝑈
𝑃 = 55.1%, 𝑝𝐷
𝑃 = 44.9% 
 
    𝐸[𝑟𝐶] = 30.3%  (expected-return of the call) 
 
    𝜎𝐶 = 105.0%  (volatility of the call)  
 
 




Figure 8: Example of a Volatility Smile 
              
Obtained from S&P 500 Index options with an expiration date of Mar. 17, 2012 (time to 
expiration = 46 days).  Underlying price = 1,312.41.  Risk-free rate = 0.1995%.  Forward price = 
1,308.86.   
 
 




Figure 9: Fitted Spline, Fourth-Order with a Single Knot at the Money 
              
Obtained from S&P 500 Index options on Jan. 31, 2012 with an expiration date of Mar. 17, 2012 
(time to expiration = 46 days).  Underlying price = 1,312.41.  Risk-free rate = 0.1995%.  
Forward price = 1,308.86.   
 
 




Figure 10: Implied Risk-Neutral Probability Distribution without Tails 
              
Implied from S&P 500 Index options on Jan. 31, 2012 with an expiration date of Mar. 17, 2012 
(time to expiration = 46 days).  Underlying price = 1,312.41.  Risk-free rate = 0.1995%.  
Forward price = 1,308.86.  Density function and cumulative function obtained numerically via 











Figure 11: Truncated Distribution Compared to Non-Truncated Distribution 
              
Implied from S&P 500 Index options on Jan. 31, 2012 with an expiration date of Mar. 17, 2012 
(time to expiration = 46 days).  Underlying price = 1,312.41.  Risk-free rate = 0.1995%.  
Forward price = 1,308.86.  Non-truncated distribution obtained numerically via equations (5) and 




 percentiles.  Truncated distribution displayed over 
entire range of distribution.  
 
 





Figure 12: Lognormal Tails Compared to Tails Extrapolated from the Volatility Smile 
              
Implied from S&P 500 Index options on Jan. 31, 2012 with an expiration date of Mar. 17, 2012 
(time to expiration = 46 days).  Underlying price = 1,312.41.  Risk-free rate = 0.1995%.  
Forward price = 1,308.86.  Dotted line represents the implied volatilities resulting from attaching 




 percentiles of the probability density function.  Solid line 
represents the fitted spline with tails extrapolated from the volatility smile.  The left tail is a 
linear extrapolation of the volatility smile between the 2nd and 5th percentile.  The right tail is a 
linear extrapolation of the volatility smile between the 95th and the 98th percentile.  Vertical 








 percentiles.  2
nd
 percentile = 1,071.28.  5
th
 percentile = 
1,151.49.  95
th
 percentile = 1,416.01. 98
th
 percentile = 1,437.46. 
 
 






Figure 13: Generalized Extreme Value Density Function Tails Compared to Density Tails 
Extrapolated from the Volatility Smile 
              
Implied from S&P 500 Index options on Jan. 31, 2012 with an expiration date of Mar. 17, 2012 
(time to expiration = 46 days).  Underlying price = 1,312.41.  Risk-free rate = 0.1995%.  
Forward price = 1,308.86.  Dark line represents the fitted spline with left tail extrapolated from 
the volatility smile.  Light line represents a tail from a Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) 
distribution chosen such that the density and cumulative distribution match the spline-fitted 
distribution at the 5
th
 percentile, and also so that their densities match at the 2
nd
 percentile.  The 
location parameter of the GEV is estimated to be 1280.61; the scale parameter 47.49; and the 




 percentiles.  2
nd
 percentile = 
1,071.28.  5
th
 percentile = 1,151.49. 
 
 




Figure 14: Generalized Extreme Value Cumulative Distribution Tails Compared to 
Cumulative Distribution Tails Extrapolated from the Volatility Smile 
              
Implied from S&P 500 Index options on Jan. 31, 2012 with an expiration date of Mar. 17, 2012 
(time to expiration = 46 days).  Underlying price = 1,312.41.  Risk-free rate = 0.1995%.  
Forward price = 1,308.86.  Dark line represents the fitted spline with left tail extrapolated from 
the volatility smile.  Light line represents a tail from a Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) 
distribution chosen such that the density and cumulative distribution match the spline-fitted 
distribution at the 5
th
 percentile, and also so that their densities match at the 2
nd
 percentile.  The 
location parameter of the GEV is estimated to be 1280.61; the scale parameter 47.49; and the 




 percentiles.  2
nd
 percentile = 
1,071.28.  5
th
 percentile = 1,151.49. 
 
 




Figure 15: Time Series of Option-Implied Moments using Truncated Tails 




































Figure 16: Time Series of Option-Implied Moments using Lognormal Tails 





































Figure 17: Time Series of Option-Implied Moments using GEV Tails 







































Figure 18: Time Series of Option-Implied Moments using Smile-Extrapolated Tails 





































Figure 19: Normal Probability Plot, Implied Volatility 
                   
Normal probability plot comparing standardized residuals from GARCH(1,1) model against theoretical z-scores from a normal distribution.  PPCC is 






Figure 20: Normal Probability Plot, Implied Skewness 
                   
Normal probability plot comparing standardized residuals from GARCH(1,1) model against theoretical z-scores from a normal distribution.  PPCC is 






Figure 21: Normal Probability Plot, Implied Kurtosis 
                   
Normal probability plot comparing standardized residuals from GARCH(1,1) model against theoretical z-scores from a normal distribution.  PPCC is 





Figure 22: Cumulative Distribution Function, Implied Volatility 
                   
Dark line is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the standardized residuals from GARCH(1,1) model.  For comparison, dashed, light 





Figure 23: Cumulative Distribution Function, Implied Skewness 
                   
Dark line is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the standardized residuals from GARCH(1,1) model.  For comparison, dashed, light 






Figure 24: Cumulative Distribution Function, Implied Kurtosis 
                   
Dark line is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the standardized residuals from GARCH(1,1) model.  For comparison, dashed, light 




Figure 25: Separate Fitted Splines for Put and Calls 
              
Obtained from S&P 500 Index options with an expiration date of Mar. 17, 2012 (time to 
expiration = 46 days).  Underlying price = 1,312.41.  Risk-free rate = 0.1995%.  Implied 
volatilities calculated using the underlying price as the forward price. 
 
 





Figure 26: Finding the Forward Price from Interpolated Put and Call Prices 
              
Obtained from S&P 500 Index options with an expiration date of Mar. 17, 2012 (time to 
expiration = 46 days).  Underlying price = 1,312.41.  Risk-free rate = 0.1995%.  Implied 
volatilities calculated using the underlying price as the forward value.  Vertical line represents 
the option-implied forward price (1,308.86), where the put price equals the call price. 
 
 




Figure 27: Convergence of Implied Kurtosis Estimate 
              
Obtained from S&P 500 Index options with an expiration date of Mar. 17, 2012 (time to 
expiration = 46 days).  Underlying price = 1,312.41.  Risk-free rate = 0.1995%.  Vertical line 
represents the option-implied forward price (1,308.86).  Graph depicts each one cent strike’s 
contribution to implied kurtosis.  See equation (19). 
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